

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

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with

HASTINGS KEITH

Member of Congress from Massachusetts, 1959 to 1973

Recorded by Charles T. Morrissey

for

FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, INC.

as part of its project

THE MODERN CONGRESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

November 4, 1976

June 2, 1979

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It needs to be more explicit HK
HK

PREFACE

This oral history memoir is one in a series intended to document the experiences and reflections of the men and women who served in the United States Senate and House of Representatives in the mid-twentieth century (1922-1977).

Under the leadership of Brooks Hays of Arkansas and Walter H. Judd of Minnesota, Former Members of Congress (FMC) was organized in 1970 to help those who had served in Congress to stay in touch with each other and, more importantly, to utilize the experience of former members of the House and Senate in promoting a better understanding of the American federal system of government and especially of the Congress as an institution. Today FMC is a non-profit, non-partisan, educational membership corporation of some 560 members.

As early as 1970 Warren Cikins, first executive director of FMC, and Brooks Hays began recording interviews with Mr. Hays' former congressional colleagues. Oral history began as a program in 1973 with Basil Whitener of North Carolina as chairman of the Oral History Committee. Varying arrangements were made for recording interviews--in some instances a local history or political science professor served as interviewer, or one FMC member interviewed another. This became known as phase I of the present oral history project.

In 1976 Charles T. Morrissey became FMC's oral history consultant and in 1977, when a record number of members had left Congress, Jed Johnson, Jr., present executive director of Former Members of Congress, launched a more systematic, comprehensive set of interviews with regional professional oral historians as interviewers. In addition to Charles Morrissey (who conducted two-thirds of this set of interviews) and Fern Ingersoll (who interviewed as well as coordinated the project) the regional interviewers included Michaelyn Chou, resource librarian at the University of Hawaii; Enid Douglass, director of the Oral History Program at Claremont Graduate School in California; Ronald Grele, research director at the New Jersey Historical Commission; G. Wesley Johnson, director of the Phoenix (Arizona) History Project; John A. Neuenschwander, professor in the History Department of Carthage

College (Wisconsin); Shirley Tanzer, director of the Oregon Jewish Oral History and Archive Project; Morton Tenzer, director of the Institute of Urban Research at the University of Connecticut; and Nancy Whistler, director of oral history at the Western History Department of the Denver Public Library. Forrest Pogue, Dan Fenn, and Alton Frye served as academic advisors. This became known as phase 2, and the entire project was entitled "The Modern Congress in American History."

A grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities--part given outright and part given to match grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, Finance Factors Foundation, the Auxiliary of Former Members of Congress and individual contributions--made possible the processing of the first-phase interviews and the research, interviewing, and processing of the second-phase interviews. The grant from the Rockefeller Foundation financed interviews with fourteen former congresswomen.

In all, over one hundred former members of Congress were interviewed. For phase 2 those congressmen and congresswomen were selected who:

had the vantage point of long years of service, (although some short-termers were also interviewed to get their viewpoints);

had served in party or committee leadership positions; and

were recognized by their colleagues as being particularly knowledgeable and perceptive.

Phase 1 interviewees, though self-selected, met one or more of these criteria. In phase 2 an effort was made to interview a representative number of members from House and Senate, from each of the principal parties, and from most states. Both members and non-members of FMC were interviewed.

A year's research in the Library of Congress and regional libraries preceded phase 2 interviewing. Among those working on research were Gregory Sanford (University of Vermont) and interns from the American Studies Program

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Goto City 2000
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at American University--William McCann, Thomas Ficarra, David Jaffe, and Deborah Carlson. To the extent that funds allowed, interviewers did additional research in the papers of the congressmen and congresswomen.* The use of the facilities of the Congressional Research Service and the advice of its specialists greatly facilitated research.

After transcription, sufficient editing was done to ensure clarity but not to alter the spoken quality of the interview. Interviewees reviewed their transcripts, sometimes adding and occasionally subtracting material. Diane Douglas, Mary Jo Deering, Carolyn Hoffman, and Jean Tucker did much of the editing. Dorothy Bageant, Sue Urbanski, Carol McKee, and Betty Giles did most of the transcribing and final typing.

A copy of each edited transcript will be in the Library of Congress and in a regional library of the interviewee's choice. Unless an interviewee has restricted his interview transcript for a period of time it will also be in the microfiche collection of the Microfilming Corporation of America which will list all interviews in the series in its catalogue. Most of the tapes from which the transcripts were made will be in the Library of Congress although interviewees were given the choice of having the tapes of their interviews returned to them.

Charles Morrissey served as director of oral history from 1977 through 1979, but continued into 1980 to advise the coordinator on questions of editorial format, legal releases, and the like. Robert L. Peabody, who became project director in 1980, reviewed many of the transcripts. Henry P. Smith III, as counsellor

* Hastings Keith's scrapbooks, which were in his possession, were a very valuable source of background information.

assisted with legal and financial questions. Fern Ingersoll coordinated the project, directing research and moving the transcripts through the varied states to completion. She directed the Rockefeller-funded part of the project focused on former congresswomen. Ann Brownson contributed many hours of proofreading.

Washington, D. C.
May 12, 1980

KEITH, Hastings, a Representative from Massachusetts; born in Brockton, Plymouth County, Mass., November 22, 1915; graduated from Brockton High School, Deerfield Academy, and the University of Vermont at Burlington in 1938; graduate work at Harvard University in 1938; member of the faculty of the Boston University Evening College of Commerce in 1948 and 1949; in 1933 was a student in the Citizens Military Training Camps; served as battery officer in Massachusetts National Guard; during World War II served in the United States Army with eighteen months overseas service in Europe; graduate of the Command and General Staff School; lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve; salesman and later district manager for the Equitable Life Assurance Society in Boston, Mass., 1946-1952; member of the State senate 1953-1956; partner in the firm of Roger Keith & Sons, general insurance, Brockton, Mass.; unsuccessful candidate for the Republican nomination for Congress in 1958; elected as a Republican to the Eighty-sixth and to the five succeeding Congresses (January 3, 1959-January 3, 1971). *Reelected to the Ninety-second Congress.*

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INTERVIEW WITH HASTINGS KEITH

for

FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, INC.

Session I - November 4, 1979

Place: Mr. Keith's home, Washington, D. C.

Interviewer: Charles T. Morrissey

CHARLES T. MORRISSEY: Let's start in 1952. What prompted you to run for the state senate?

HASTINGS KEITH: Well, we really can't start in '52 because I made up my mind to run for public office while I was at the University of Vermont. My father, Roger Keith, had been mayor of Brockton Massachusetts and a state senator. He could have run for the Congress but he had too much respect for the incumbent, Richard Wigglesworth. I had a desire to do something that I felt he should have done. And accordingly, even while I was courting my wife (my first wife, Louise Harriman) in the mid-forties during the war, I told her that some day I was going to run for Congress. In all of my activities, almost from the time I reached maturity, I had that goal in mind. That's a rather unique thing--for someone to know what he wants to do; yet of course, I didn't mention it (other than to my wife) for fear of prompting comments such as: "Well, who the hell does he think he is?"

But my choice of profession, my more than average participation in public causes, my efforts on behalf of the Republican party, particularly in the city of Brockton where I organized a group of people to run for the city council when there appeared to be a dearth of candidates--all of these activities reflected my interest in public service. These things plus a mayoralty candidate running for office who would not have had a city council to help him prompted me to get involved and earned for me, if I may say so, the respect of the community. I was considered as one who was seriously interested in better government. Yet I was careful to remain aloof from the kind of conflicts that could have creamed me, such as a school committee or a city council elective office. Even when I was overseas I considered running against the incumbent congressman from Brockton, who in my view wasn't a contemporary in his approach to problems of the nation or in his approach to politics.

(KEITH) Upon getting back to Massachusetts I realized that you just couldn't run for Congress with service to Uncle Sam as the dominant factor; although knowing what I do now, I could have been merchandized and perhaps won a congressional seat much earlier, had I, for example, in '47 run when there was an opening in the seat for Congress from the Cape [Cape Cod, Massachusetts]. If I had lived in the Cape area and had known what I do now, I think I might have been able to be moved in the way many candidates are now moved by powers and money.

MORRISSEY: But that was a pre-TV era.

KEITH: Yes, that was a pre-TV era, but nevertheless there were people running for Congress on very slim experience and you find them winning in 1952 just on Ike's [Dwight D. Eisenhower] coattails with hardly any previous political experience.

And there are trends that can be capitalized on. For example in the year in which I was elected to Congress, 1958, there was a recession and there were only eighteen or nineteen ~~new~~ Republicans elected that year--new Republicans. To show you the trend, there were six Republican congressmen in Connecticut in '58, and in '59 there were six Democrats, because of a recession.

There were times when one could have gotten into the lists and won an election even though one really didn't have the qualifications but I followed the "school solution." I did the things that one was supposed to do and endeared or persuaded or forced myself into the good graces of the Republican organization within my senatorial constituency, that is the state senate, and moved from Brockton to West Bridgewater, which was in a different congressional district, so that I could run from the Cape, the rest of Plymouth other than the city of Brockton and from greater New Bedford. I ran in this district rather than from Brockton and Quincy. Brockton had been my home and would to the casual observer have been a more natural constituency. I did this because I felt my chances were better and my philosophy was more consistent with those of the Cape and New Bedford.

Mayor [Edward] Cermack of Chicago once said when he was asked where he had learned his politics, "On the campus of the University of Michigan." I learned some of it at the campus of the University of Vermont and applied it; I've applied it all of my life. So I ran for the state senate against an incumbent who, incidentally, had succeeded my father in the state senate twenty years earlier. He had become something of a buffoon.

MORRISSEY: Because of his age?

KEITH: Age and time passing by and he not staying with it. He had been a doctor and he made such statements as he had never seen a child with cancer, when Jim Britt was raising money for the treatment of cancer in children. The pension issue was on the scene in '52. Some legislation had slipped through favoring members of the state senate, and he was asked about it and said, "Well, I was here all night long and no such legislation passed." It was revealed that legislation had passed.

It had been taken for granted in the city that the towns supported him; and the towns thought the city supported him. I discovered that he had a pretty fragile base. He went down to the towns to cover his losses. But, as a result of my campaign, when he drove into the town of Lakeville, a small town with a very easily defined central area, and said, almost in a "My good man" fashion, "Uh, could you tell me," (this was to the foreman on the trash disposal truck) "Could you tell me where the Lakeville town hall is?" And old Jim Viggers, who happened to be chairman of the Democratic town committee in Lakeville said, "This is the town hall over here, that's the library, this is the school, and that's the road back to Brockton. We're gonna vote for Hasty Keith."

That kind of thing got around very quickly. I won that primary and found myself opposed by a blind war veteran who had been, or may have been at the time, head of the VFW [Veterans of Foreign Wars] in Brockton. He was a very articulate, common sense, down-to-earth in appearance kind of fellow, but never had really had any experience of any sort. I appeared, in contrast, sort of upper-middle income, and he appeared as a guy who had given his all for his country and ought to be given a chance to do more. I won marginally over him in 1952. I, generally speaking, have courted my opponent immediately upon the conclusion of a campaign. We became very good friends.

MORRISSEY: Why do you always court your opponents after a campaign?

KEITH: Well, as Walter Judd says, "You make love to your enemies." Besides that, generally speaking, end up liking them. Additionally, they have friends, they have influence, they can make contributions, they like to be respected. I think it's common sense to use their resources, to communicate with them to, if possible, develop mutual respect. It takes the unpleasantness out of campaigning and there's enough unpleasantness amongst your supporters without having, it amongst the competitors.

MORRISSEY: Let me go back to your undergraduate days at the University of Vermont. Were you active in campus politics?

KEITH: I ran the combine of fraternities of which my fraternity, Sigma Phi, was one; and the other combine had as its top leadership the Phi Deltas, the Kappa Sigs, and some others. We pretty much controlled the patronage. The juiciest plum was the junior prom, because you had tickets to pass out. And in our combine we had "Bud" Spaulding, who was a Burlingtonian, and had a lot of what you might call grass-roots support within the college community anyway. Bud's closest friend was Johnny Suitor who was a good friend of mine and went to Deerfield Academy but was a Phi Delt. After controlling this thing for four years--and it was a sort of an ad hoc, informal organization, I was nominated by our group to be permanent class president. The other group nominated Johnny Suitor.

Johnny Suitor won, as I recall it, by one vote. There was a very small number of votes cast, but neither of us campaigned, neither of us activated our combine. I have no doubt that my friend Spaulding supported Suitor who was his close personal friend. And Suitor, I'm sure, made a better class president, a permanent class president, than I would have made. He was loaded with leadership, very articulate, a very high-grade guy. I had no problems with his election and no problems working with him subsequently and to the best interests of Vermont. We're the closest of friends now.

MORRISSEY: How about your classroom work? Did that urge you on towards a political career?

KEITH: The courses were selected with that in mind. There's an interesting thing. I'm not really extraordinarily bright and I don't have the most retentive of minds. I took political science 1 from [a Professor] Caroll. He only gave me a D the first semester. I was really surprised, disappointed. I didn't think I deserved it and protested to him that that was a bad thing to have on my record.

There was another professor who taught political science 1 - named Mel Latsch. So I shifted to Mel Latsch with Caroll's approval. I got an A and I figured it was because I studied a little bit harder, but ^{also} I think Latsch wanted to show that he could bring more out of Keith than could Caroll. Caroll was sort of a reserved, stuffy, individual without a great deal of political savvy or charm. Mel was a more gregarious kind of guy.

Incidentally, a very interesting little anecdote related to that. In my campaign for Congress some years later, in 1958, twenty years after graduating from Vermont, and eager to

(KEITH) establish centers of influence in the fifty-five towns of my constituency, I was invited to a dinner party before a speaking engagement in the town of Cohasset. I couldn't quite figure out why I was being invited, but the man who had invited me was the head of Boston Sand and Gravel, a well-to-do family and a very delightful guy with a most attractive wife. In the midst of dinner, while discussing my campaign, he said, "What do you think Mel Latsch would say about all of this?" And I said, "Mel Latsch, how do you happen to know him?" He said, "I went to the University of Vermont and I took poly sci I from him." And that was how I happened to get invited to dinner!

I might add that as you know, "amongst so few the influence of each one is the more deeply felt." There were very few Vermont grads in that area, but such as there were, they were helpful.

I guess my secret weapon in all of my campaigns and the rest of my constituency was a large number of Brocktonians who had moved to the Cape. This, in addition to my being a good Lieutenant, and having helped to recruit two batteries of National Guard--one in Bourne, and another in Falmouth--was most helpful. I guess, like Bill Week's father, Sinclair Weeks, and like Harry Truman, I had a great deal of strength in the men of Battery H and of Battery G.

They knew me to be a very democratic Republican. I even would occasionally loan them my car when we were stationed in Texas. I was not fraternizing, but I treated them as individuals. I even did KP [kitchen police] on Christmas Day in 1940 while we were on active duty, just so that these men could have their time off and so that they could see that we were all in this thing together.

I had a tremendously fine rapport with probably 150 men that returned to that area and became extraordinarily active in my campaign in subtle ways. Janitors in the schools or fishermen or engineers working for the government knew Hasty Keith was a fair guy: he may be a Republican, but he understands the problems of the little fellow. And the word got around. The Johnny Ferragatos and the people like that who ran gas stations and would put stickers on cars. They'd been in my old outfit. Some of them named children for me. That's a part of the game that may be of interest, I don't know. *Ferragato*

MORRISSEY: Are there any other campus or other teachers at UVM [University of Vermont] that might have had a bearing on your interest in politics as a career?

KEITH: Yes, I'd say that Professor [Paul] Evans was extraordinarily influential in developing my global perspective, and we do live in a "global village." I didn't know what the

term meant at the time, but I was very honored to be amongst those whose records were such that they could be in the sort of seminar he put on world affairs. I would imagine that he would stack up favorably against a professor of foreign policy or international affairs at any educational institution.

My instructor in ROTC [Reserve Officers Training Corps], Major Elbridge Colby, had a big influence over me. He taught military science and tactics--and really made it come alive. We became good friends and at times his fatherly advice was most helpful. He was the father of Bill [William] Colby who was to become head of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]. Incidentally, there is no better way to study the principles of war than Elbridge Colby's book on the Civil War.

Upon graduating from Vermont I went to Harvard summer school and took a course from William Yandell Elliott and another one from Professor Freidricks. Both of them were very famous as professors in the field of international affairs and European history.

MORRISSEY: Were you thinking of doing graduate work in political science?

KEITH: No. I was thinking that I might like to teach at Deerfield Academy and that if I took these courses, I could do so. I wanted to teach it from the New York Times. I went up to Deerfield and interviewed them - or rather, they interviewed me - and I tried to convince them to hire me. They had, as you can imagine, extraordinarily competent people in the field of foreign policy and contemporary politics and things of that sort.

I had another offer which was to be an agency management trainee for the Equitable Life Assurance Society. Mr. [Frank] Boyden, the headmaster of Deerfield, said, "Well, Hastings, if you can teach, you can sell." I would suggest that you go ahead with the Equitable rather than come here, because we've got Jim Averitt and he can do a much better job, really, because of his experience." *and, if you can sell you can teach*

MORRISSEY: Had you considered going to law school?

KEITH: No. I frankly knew I didn't have the competency. I made the mistake of comparing myself a lot of times with the finished product. I didn't compare myself with my contemporaries. I didn't feel that I had the aptitude. I'm not a great student. Or rather I am a great student but I don't have the capability to absorb, recall, and put on paper. It comes hard to me, but I work hard at it and I do it.

MORRISSEY: In one of the scrapbooks that I read you described a congressman as being a salesman for his district. I would gather then that the belief in the skills of salesmanship is something that you would believe is very helpful to a congressman?

KEITH: Oh yes. You have to help people. I was assistant manager with the Equitable and I always told my agents that people bought life insurance from people whom they liked. You should not only do things for people so that they might like you, but that they might respect you, too. I'm a chartered life underwriter whose pledge, as he accepts the award, is that he will treat his client's problems as though they were his own. I think this is the way to sell. Try to get on the side of the man you're selling, literally, not just from a desire to get the sale.

MORRISSEY: That's very interesting, because, as you know, Congress is overloaded with lawyers, and not many people come out of the small business background that you did.

KEITH: It's interesting in that regard, it brings to memory a very difficult interview that I had with the Boston Globe in the 1970 campaign when [Gerry] Studds was running against me. They said, "Mr. Keith, why do you think that you should be reelected?" And I said, "Well, first of all I know the problems of the constituency, having been down there on the job for twelve years, and I really think that that experience and that knowledge has been helpful in the past and can be helpful in the future. In private life I was a small businessman and there was a lot of small business in my constituency. I can be helpful and have been helpful to them."

They also asked me how I felt about abortion. And this is not the main thrust of the story, but I want to finish, sort of, the format of the interview. I told them that certainly, after a certain period, an abortion really amounted to, I felt, taking the life of an individual. It would only be under rare circumstances that I would favor abortion.

When they capsulized that interview and reported on it in their column about Keith and Studds side-by-side, it read, "Mr. Keith, why do you think you should be reelected?" "Well, I'm a small businessman and there's a lot of small business in the district." That was one of the points that they made. They just narrowed it to that. "Mr. Keith, how do you feel about abortion?" "I'm against it."

They just took the briefest of answers that would not reflect any thoughtfulness, any consideration on my part. And they did it in a way that reflected sort of unfavorably on me,

(KEITH) I think. And this is the way a newspaper can slant a story and affect your fortunes. I didn't mean to get off the subject, but when it came to mind I thought I would tell it.

MORRISSEY: Why had you gone to the University of Vermont in the first place?

KEITH: Well, I pause here, because I didn't really want to go to college very much. I had, I think, entrepreneurial interests in high school. I'd done very well in odd jobs and made enough money to send myself to college. I sold life insurance when I was in college. I made a little bit of money, not much. But, I'd sold shoes and made a lot of money, by comparison. I sold Walkover, Packard, Eaton, and Douglas shoes. Douglas shoes were \$3.33, \$4.44 and \$5.55 a pair. I would have a display two or three nights a month and sell these shoes. I thought I could make a nice living in the shoe business or running a store or a market, but my father was a graduate of Amherst, my uncle also. My contemporaries were going to college and it was the thing to do. So having graduated from high school without good enough grades to get into a college of any substance or character, my dad was insistent that I go to a small New England college.

I went to Deerfield boarding for one year and Mr. Boyden recommended that I go to Vermont. That's where I went and they took me, because he recommended me. I think it was a very wise choice. If I'd gone to Amherst, I would have just been another little fish in a big pond. Amherst is a small pond, but big so far as intellect is concerned.

When I got up to Vermont I was one of the few men in my class who owned a sport jacket and a pair of gray flannels. There were many who had come from out-of-state with a background comparable to mine. I don't mean it to sound sort of better than thou, but the fact is these were Depression years, this was 1934, and to go to Vermont you just had to be a high school graduate from a Vermont school. To be recommended from Deerfield was all they needed. They were looking for students in those days.

END SIDE 1, TAPE I

BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE I

Incidentally, I got my own meals a lot of the time. I did a lot of babysitting. The thing I think that I was most proud of while I was at the university was that I was the business manager of both the yearbook and the newspaper. I prevailed upon the president, [Guy] Bailey, to give us compensation for the jobs we did. If you were low on the totem pole

(KEITH) you got \$17.50, \$25.00, \$37.50, or \$50.00. If you were the editor or the business manager of either the newspaper or the yearbook you got \$150.00, and I was the business manager of both the yearbook and the newspaper and made \$300.00 that way. That was an awful lot of money in those days. Between that and a little help from my father and a little help from a distant relative, I wasn't much of a burden to my family and I felt I could have gone into business and made a living.

MORRISSEY: Let me go back to Professor Evans. When you got to Congress you voted for foreign aid. Do you see a relationship there? In other words, his teaching that the world is really a global village perhaps was the reason why you were responsive to foreign aid?

KEITH: I didn't have much confidence that it was going to do much good. I had an uncle, Gerald Keith, who had been a career foreign service officer. He felt that when the balloon went up, Tito and the rest of them would be on the side of the communists. He felt that, by and large, our foreign aid could cause almost as many difficulties as it could reap rewards for us.

When I asked his advice he would say, "Hastings, remember that it did save Greece but remember that the times have changed and I'm not going to advise you." He had been top man for Ambassador Bliss Lane who had resigned in protest over our failure to insist on free elections in Poland in 1947. He wrote a book called I Saw Poland Betrayed. My uncle was a career foreign service officer and diplomat and yet was very much against aid to countries such as Poland, Yugoslavia.

I made quite a study of it. I traveled extensively and I felt that it would keep the lines of communications open and that it might do some good and I didn't think it would do any harm. So it was a thoughtful decision and not one about which I necessarily had deep convictions. I had my fingers crossed.

MORRISSEY: From the scrapbooks it is evident that your interest in the cost of pensions began when you were serving in the Massachusetts senate.

KEITH: I wasn't aware that the scrapbooks would verify that. I'm glad that they do. It is something I really need as I pursue this issue now with others who are recently getting on the band wagon and are hard to persuade of that.

MORRISSEY: But let me say also that the scrapbooks don't show that you pursued that interest through most of your congressional career. It reappears toward the end, '71, '72.

KEITH: Well, if you had the legislative history, which is available, you would find that the first real issue on which I spoke was pensions.

MORRISSEY: Spoke in the Congress?

KEITH: Yes.

MORRISSEY: Yes, I noticed that.

KEITH: It was the Railroad Retirement Act of 1960. And, I think it's worth developing a little bit, because it is typical of the problem that faces the politician in this country. The Railroad Retirement Act was intended to take care of those unique situations that confronted the railroad retirees. It had a mixture of social security and what you might call a staff plan which was financed by the railroads. In 1960 President [John Fitzgerald] Kennedy and Oren Harris, who was the chairman of the Commerce Committee on the House side, - a fine, venerable, competent committee chairman, now a judge in Arkansas, a typical Arkansas-type, Harvard educated probably, trained for this job just like [J. William] Fulbright, Wilbur Mills, and I've forgotten who the other formidable member of Congress was I think on the Senate side--

MORRISSEY: [John L.] McClellan.

KEITH: McClellan, really students of legislation and of history and well-trained.

Harris filed a bill to update the benefits in accordance with the increases in the cost of living that had occurred since the last change. During the hearings it became evident that there were a lot of abuses. Women could collect successive maternity benefits without having returned to work. People could get fired and draw their retirement income. There were lots of examples of feather bedding by the legislative branch of government. Feather bedding usually applies to the railroads, but in this case it was legislative feather bedding. And I recall Chris [Christian] Herter, when he was governor of Massachusetts, and the labor people would come along for increases in aid to dependent children, increases in aid to the aged and increases in unemployment compensation. Herter said, "Yes, you deserve them, but only if you clean up the abuses." And so for a year and a half these fellows sat on their duffs and got nothing because he was insisting on a quid pro quo.

So, I mentioned this to the committee and, amongst others, the railroads put up an excellent case against the feather bedding practices which were costing them \$300 to \$400 million

(KEITH) a year at least.

So, they reported out a clean bill. There were eleven who dissented from it; and all eleven of them, one Republican and the other ten Democrats, had received substantial contributions from railroad unions--Harley Staggers amongst them. But Harris carried this clean bill (to the floor) which took care of nine-tenths of the abuses.

In the midst of the debate over came a messenger from the Senate. "Mr. Speaker, a message from the Senate." And down the aisle ran the secretary of the Senate in the usual fashion and thrust into the Speaker's hands this message which was ~~not~~ the original Kennedy-Harris bill. It had just passed the Senate. This was August, I think, of 1960. And under the rules you had to take up this Senate bill at once. As I recall, the House accepted the original bill with all the increases and none of the improvements, in substantive aspects, of the legislation.

That was sent over to the White House for signature, and you'll find that I spoke on this whole matter rather extensively. And I used my state experience and my legislative experience. I think I might have even mentioned Chris Herter by name.

Well, after we adjourned I got a phone call from the White House asking if I would support a veto and I said, "Not only would I support it, I recommend it highly, because this the people will understand. They have heard about feather bedding on railroads ever since they were students, and here you have it in a perfect form." But the president didn't veto it, he signed it quietly.

President Kennedy won that election and /Richard/ Nixon lost very narrowly. I think if Eisenhower had gone on television and aired this thing, Nixon would have been elected in '60 and they wouldn't have gotten that kind of legislation. And do you know it cost them \$7 billion, just two or three years ago to buy out the railroad retirement benefits that had been accrued in order to properly integrate this thing with social security. In short, it cost a heck of a lot to recover the damage that was done by not tending to that knitting back in 1960.

MORRISSEY: Why do you suppose Eisenhower signed it after indicating perhaps he was going to veto it?

KEITH: He didn't indicate his position while the legislation was under consideration. If he had done that, it might have been a smart move. Herter used to do that, as a governor. I don't think we got any signal from the White

(KEITH) House that they would veto it. If we did, we didn't get it in time. The parliamentary situation just collapsed.

Then you will find that I spoke, I believe, against the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] getting a twenty-year retirement and against liberalization of pension plans for the judges.

You may recall Felix Frankfurter's widow getting a special pension of \$5,000 about twenty years ago. He hadn't thought enough of his widow to take out an insurance policy, and when he died the Congress had to give her a pension. This kind of thing is just abhorrent to me--Congress bailing out the widow.

When I was in the state legislature, the city clerk of Brockton, a grand old man who had been a great friend of my father, had gone all around the state explaining the state's retirement plan to all the city clerks. He was the authority on the subject. Well, he thought his wife was going to predecease him and he had elected for himself the larger benefit instead of the joint and survivor annuity. He died first. So my father came in with representatives of that family and asked me to file a special bill to take care of his widow. I declined to do it, because he knew the situation, could have taken insurance at the time, could have taken the other option.

I'm willing to bet you that his widow got that some way or other quietly, because that was the way the Massachusetts legislature took care of things. People with pull get around the errors in judgment that they make. We find it even today in the Congress with "Tip" [Thomas P.] O'Neill in the chair. A proposal that passed the Senate would allow people to count up to ten years of time spent as national campaigning committee employees towards a civil service retirement if they subsequently came to work in civil service positions in the Senate or House at the highest echelons. It was done for a clerk or a sergeant-at-arms of the House or Senate. It provided up to ten years of his campaign work to count towards his civil service pension. The bill passed the Senate without a word and it came over to the House and it was quietly put into committee. Then one day, under suspension of the rules, it was reported out very quietly, and they added a section two. Any congressman retiring in the year 1978 could have that final year count as the three-year average. No debate. It just quietly passed.

I didn't write letters to the editors, but I did call two or three key people in the editorial sections in the [Washington] Post and the [Washington] Star and alerted them as to what was going on, and it was killed.

But there you have Tip O'Neill doing exactly the same thing that he did when he was in the state legislature, as

(KEITH) Speaker of the House. It's a disease that we really need to find some way to cure.

MORRISSEY: Did you see other evidence of the disease during the years you actually served in Congress?

KEITH: I would say that the average congressman properly gets terribly involved in the work of his constituency or of his committee. The average congressman feels that the average member will of course do what is in the best interest of the people and that the abuse is at a minimum. You are fighting city hall if you do differently, and by and large you have confidence that these fellows are pretty good and you live and let live. If you are going to be obstreperous, you don't get the work done that you were sent there to do. And what you achieve is infinitesimal as contrasted with accomplishing your assigned responsibilities.

There are people who thrive on being mavericks, but I would find that a very unrewarding kind of thing and always did. I didn't, and I don't, go around nit-picking about little things. I'm sometimes accused of doing just that with the pension reform now. But it's because of the magnitude of it that I'm involved, and because it is not a minor matter. The long-range social and economic aspects of this thing lead me to persist in what I'm doing.

MORRISSEY: Why in '56 did you take on Congressman [Donald W.] Nicholson, the incumbent?

KEITH: First, I felt that I could do a better job and I think that you really have to believe that you can do a better job if you really want to have the ability to stay in there. I felt he was not doing a good job and I felt I could do a better job. I really believed it and, although I didn't say so, I had that conviction. I also felt that I could win. I think it is essential that you don't start something that you don't have a chance of winning. In the first place you won't get any support.

There were others who were waiting for the job, and I was encouraged in this by such people as the senator from the Cape, Edward C. Stone. He was the retired president of the Employers Group Liability. He retired at a pension of \$64,000 a year in the year 1947. He had been both its legal counsel and its president. He had served in the state legislature and when he had retired at the age of sixty-five he ran for the state senate. A tremendous man. A great student of [Abraham] Lincoln and a man for whom I had ~~great~~ respect. I was somewhat afraid that even at his age he might himself get into the race, like [Samuel I.] Hayakawa. He had that kind of competence.

from the Employers Group

(KEITH) He encouraged me to run for the state senate in '52 and he encouraged me to run against Nicholson, but, nevertheless, when I got up on the platform, having heard him tell me in the wings that he thought I was doing a great job, I heard him say, "Ladies and gentlemen, we are so fortunate to have in Washington our present congressman, Donald W. Nicholson."

It's really a rough game. But, at any rate, I had been encouraged by people and I ran, because I wanted the job and felt that it was a good way to get exposure and get around the district and be in position when he retired, which I had every reason to believe would be very shortly. It was just a common-sense, getting in position.

MORRISSEY: Does it make sense for a fellow to run for Congress knowing he might lose, just to be in position two years later?

KEITH: Certainly.

MORRISSEY: That happened also with your successor, Gerry Studds. Losing the first time, winning the second.

KEITH: Yes. Sure. You build up an organization that's not likely to defect if you put on a good show.

MORRISSEY: You did that knowing that you might sacrifice your state senate seat.

KEITH: I knew that I would not only definitely sacrifice my senate seat, but if I had stayed another year, I would have had a vested interest in a pension. You have to serve five years to become qualified. I could go back now and receive an appointive or elective position for one year and collect a rather substantial pension. Just one year.

MORRISSEY: Why did Nicholson in '58 announce he wasn't going to run for reelection?

KEITH: Actually he made that announcement in '56 shortly after he was elected.

MORRISSEY: Oh really.

KEITH: I came down here and was on active duty when I was approached by the press which said that he had announced that he was going to retire. He shouldn't have done so, so quickly. You lose your leverage. What was your question?

MORRISSEY: Why did he announce his resignation, in other words, to open up the seat rather than run again?

KEITH: I suppose the press was after him. He had a tendency to--he was always on the floor, but often times he was just sitting there a bit muddled. The press was eager to get some kind of comment. So he said what he thought. I wouldn't be surprised if he said what I think he is reported to have said, "Drunk or sober I'll be a better congressman than Keith." I would say that he had no qualms about saying what was on his mind. He said, "There'll never be a [Cape Cod National] seashore except over my dead body." That was one of his strong points and one of his endearing points. I liked him for it, respected him for it. But, if a reporter asked him, he'd say, "No. I've had it."

Incidentally, he had a son who was suffering from cancer and dying. He was bitter. He lost a lot of friends in that election and he probably said, "It isn't worth it." I felt sorry for him. Incidentally, he also overcame his drinking problem, as did my wife who had been forced into it by the fallen awful pace down here.

MORRISSEY: When the seat opened in '58 I can't remember how many people were in the primary. Four?

KEITH: It was a fascinating primary. Charlie Gabriel, who had the most money, came from the northern end of the district. He was the banker to whom I have referred, who really thought he owned the seat, he had been a governor's counselor. The governor's counselor is a place where a heck of a lot of trading is done, such as race-track commissions and judicial appointments. It was really a throwback to the old days of the governor's council. It was really not a very powerful body, but it had a lot of political influence. At any rate, Gabriel was the favorite.

Nat Tilden, a very high-grade, competent farmer from Situate, opposed me because he had wanted the job himself. He ran. He was a long-time member of the legislature. And then there was a French Canadian from New Bedford who was an utterly delightful guy named Leo Bessette. He had been the head man for personnel for the public works at the state level. He came from a very fine French family in New Bedford. He had divorced his wife and moved to Boston, and to move back didn't leave him in a very good position with the French Catholic community. They nevertheless rallied 'round him.

I was considered to be the closest thing to a Cape Codder" in the race, to quote the Falmouth Enterprise, and I guess I was. It was Cape Cod that really helped me.

In the '56 campaign I was leading going into New Bedford. It was New Bedford that licked me. If I had had \$5,000 and a little more expertise in my campaign, if I could have convinced the man I asked to be my campaign manager to have become

(KEITH) my campaign manager, I would have won. His name was Everett Allen. He was the editor of the editorial page of the New Bedford Standard Times. But nobody thought Keith was going to win and he didn't want to get embroiled.

I'd like to point out at this time that there are a lot of people who say that--and this has to do with pensions and up-or-out philosophy, but it constantly comes to mind--that people want upward mobility. I find that a lot of people who are offered nice jobs in Washington don't want the Washington excitement. They want their fireside and they want their family and friends, their bowling and their Boy Scouts, their YMCA and their fishing and hunting. There isn't the desire to serve your nation--to get in on the Washington scene and carry a torch. They're much more content to stay at home and let someone else do it.

MORRISSEY: 1958 was not a good year for a young man to aspire as a Republican to a House seat.

KEITH: That's putting it mildly! [Laughter]

My district has been considered to be Republican. Actually [Harry S.] Truman had carried it and I think Governor Paul A. Dever also carried my district. I believe that it even had a Democratic congressman during the Bull Moose movement. It was generally considered by the Boston press and the New York press and the Washington press, because of statistics, to be Republican at the presidential or congressional or senatorial level. But anybody who was a student of it knew it really hadn't had a good Democrat run for the seat. I guess, well, within my memory, it almost invariably was either not contested or went, on two occasions, to candidates who had no district-wide name recognition. Nor did they have any money. The point of all this is that the Republican running for public office in 1958 was going against a nation-wide Democratic trend.

[END SIDE 2, TAPE I]

[BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE II]

A good example of this phenomenon is what happened in the state of Maine. Early in the year (1958), when they were filing for nominations for the state legislature in Maine, the Democrats as usual didn't even bother to contest some districts. By the time of the elections - in the fall - *practically* the only Republicans that were elected, were those who hadn't had anybody filing against them.

There was a swing in '58 caused by a recession largely not dealt with in the conventional fashion by Eisenhower. Ike felt we should stick to our principles and not try to buy

(KEITH) votes, so he had not given Maine the urban renewal that it felt it deserved and needed. We lost a congressional seat - and practically all the state legislation. And we lost, of course, the Senate seat to that tall handsome nice guy--

MORRISSEY: Ed Edmund S.J Muskie.

KEITH: Ed Muskie. And we lost those six seats in Connecticut.

- in my district

Well, who did the Democrats nominate? They had, I think, the same old ne'er-do-well that ran for the seat, and he was a nice guy. Would have made a fairly good congressman, but he hadn't been a success in business. He just wasn't interested in business.

The one who got the nomination was Johnny Almeida. Johnny's chief claim to fame was that he ran a bus company. It was really sort of a puddle-jumping kind of operation. Not a very good one, but they had their buses throughout southeastern Massachusetts. They, of course, all had stickers on them: "Vote for Almeida for Congress." Earlier he had fired some of his drivers because they were thinking about forming a union. The state supreme court had ordered him to rehire them and he had neglected to do so.

So labor generally speaking supported Keith. They would rather have an honest conservative or moderate than they would a faker. So I had the tacit support and sometimes the explicit support of the leadership in the labor movement and to some extent in the Democratic party because they had nominated someone they just couldn't stomach. And I won by 13,000 votes. I got less than 55 percent of the vote. Now don't tell me that district was Republican except against that kind of guy. If I had had a formidable candidate, I'd have gone down the drain like so many others. Don't think that the mayor of New Bedford wasn't smart enough to see that. The Portuguese comprised a tremendous number of votes in the primary in the city of New Bedford, but they didn't comprise a major portion of the total vote.

So, my next time out I had a very good opponent, the mayor of New Bedford, Eddie Harrington. A very glib lawyer, attractive, but a bit smooth for the rest of the constituency - the new brand of politician who didn't go particularly well with the conservatives or the country folk of the Cape and the seashore towns that comprised the northern end of the district. Unfortunately, for Eddie, the "cranberry crisis" occurred during my first term - and was successfully resolved by the time of the next campaign. The poor guy had to admit I had done a good job for growers.

MORRISSEY: Oh really?

KEITH: Yes, I (I should say Senator Saltonstall and I) solved the cranberry crisis and so it became a feather in my hat. In 1959, November, just about three weeks before Thanksgiving I received a phone call from the president of the National Cranberry Association. There were tears in his voice. "Hastings, at ten o'clock today the secretary of the department of HEW [Health Education and Welfare], Mr. [Arthur] Flemming, is going to advise the people of the United States that cranberries have been determined to have a carcinogenic spray on them and they're not to be sold."

This is a story in itself and hardly worth going into now in retrospect except to say that the position I took, I think, was ethical and good politics. I had cranberry sauce in my refrigerator and I didn't go immediately and dip a spoon into that cranberry sauce to show that I had confidence - that cranberries were good. I went to work and tried to find out what the facts were. It wasn't particularly pleasing to the growers that I was not more aggressively in their corner, but at any rate, I was in their corner.

MORRISSEY: Were you at home or in Washington?

KEITH: I was at home. I can remember the phone call just like it was yesterday.

MORRISSEY: Did I read correctly in one of the scrapbooks that you were eating cranberries at the time the phone call came in?

KEITH: No. It was about nine o'clock in the morning. I discovered, and I've forgotten now who actually ~~discovered~~ ^{uncovered} it for me, I found that there was a man by the name of Fred, I think, Astwood who lived in Chicago. He was a doctor who used aminotriazole to treat under active thyroids. Yes, he used aminotriazole - the same as the cranberry growers used. It was also a herbicide. It destroyed the chlorophyll formation competency of the plants. And inasmuch as cranberries don't have chlorophyll, it kept the weeds under control - ~~and didn't affect~~ ^{the cranberries} Astwood was using it to treat women who had underactive thyroids. When they had this either in the form of injections ^{slow} or in diet, their thyroids began to grow again. But when he withdrew the aminotriazole, they stopped growing. Therefore, it was not carcinogenic. Therefore, this was a false determination, a wrong determination by HEW. So I spent \$900 of my own money, above my allowance in telephone allowance in efforts to solve the problem and placate my cranberry growers.

(KEITH) And one of the interesting things that perhaps should be recorded here is that the Department of Agriculture didn't want to give an indemnity for this thing because they would be establishing a precedent. The cranberry growers wanted me to go the legislative route, which would have been ridiculous because all of the members of Congress would have sided with the consumers. We finally got a favorable reception from Secretary Ezra Benson and, particularly, with the help of a man by the name of, I think, Cliff McIntire from Maine who was on the Agricultural Committee and a wonderful guy. We got them to agree to give us an indemnity of \$8.13 a barrel. It was under a very unused portion of the law passed in 1933. During the Depression years when any farmer was adversely affected by governmental action, the government could take steps to assist him in the wrong that had been done. And this obscure statute was uncovered by a former member of the staff of the Agriculture Committee--who was then a lobbyist, I believe, Joe Parker. And that was the proviso under which the \$8.13 per barrel was paid.

They didn't pay it and they didn't pay it. They kept saying they were going to do it. Finally Chuck Colson, who was working with me on this, and worked on the staff of Senator Saltonstall for reelection--

MORRISSEY: Senator [Leverett] Saltonstall.

KEITH: Yes, Chuck and I decided to release the information that had been leaked to us--they were going to give the growers the indemnity. We felt certain that they wouldn't go back on Saltonstall. They might have treated Keith as just another congressman. But they had told us, so we leaked it to the press that they were going to do it. Then they had to do it. And then we got the indemnity.

I had one grower who had, I think, 40,000 barrels, and \$8.13 a barrel amounted to a lot of dough. I had fund raisers, naturally. My campaign committee or Republican town chairman was one who had been my Sunday school teacher and a very high-grade guy. He'd been head of the community chest drive in Brockton and a close personal friend. His son was my closest personal friend and he was my fund raiser. He went down to see the cranberry growers who were going to buy busloads of tickets to my \$25-a-plate dinner. They never had any busloads. After a year's time there was little left but the headlines, but they helped. They did contribute, but on the average it was \$25 or \$50, which was all I was after. But I didn't get the numbers. There are 850 cranberry growers and I didn't have twenty-five cranberry growers contribute to my campaign. In any event my fund raiser decided to pay a special call on this man who had gotten \$300,000 or more as an indemnity which meant you didn't have to treat it as income. "Why, Hasty was

(KEITH) just doing his job." /Laughter./

As one of the, I think, humorous sides to that I would like to have it as a matter or record. With reference to fund-raising I never really felt that I should conduct a conventional campaign with lots of fanfare. It wasn't like me and it wasn't like my district. And I also felt that I should be quite meticulous in taking only modest sums of money and only from people within my constituency.

My campaign fund raiser from '56 and all the way through was a man by the name of Carlton Burrell. He was a Dartmouth College graduate, a close personal friend who was a trustee by profession and was very good at keeping accurate records and thanking people and very much interested in good causes. He was selected by the Kiwanis as the Kiwanis man of the year in the little town of Whitman. He was on the board of a savings bank. He was utterly devoted to me and my philosophy, meticulous in his record keeping.

The statute prohibited any corporate contributions, and we would get on occasion a corporate check and we would have to send it back. And only rarely would that check be substituted by a personal one.

We kept, generally speaking, not more than \$100 from any one individual and not any money from out-of-state. With some exceptions where I happened to know the individual and would feel that there wasn't any obligation or that he wasn't doing it for spurious reasons but because of personal reasons, I would keep the check--I mean, of course, my treasurer would keep it.

I was the senior Republican on the [Interstate and Foreign] Commerce Committee sub-committee that was looking into mutual funds. And my district had, oh, the president of Eaton and Howard, the summer residency of the chairman of the board of Massachusetts Investors Tr'st, the chief executive officer of Massachusetts Investors Trust, who, when he had been an attorney in 1956 had been my campaign manager for Situate. (I believe this was long before he began to devote himself exclusively to (the field of) mutual funds). His name was John Barnard. He is now the chief executive officer and probably setting a salary of \$200 or \$300 thousand a year.

These people were eager to help me and I was welcoming their assistance, but their contributions were limited, if they lived outside the district, to modest sums. In no case would they be in excess of \$100. In one of my campaigns in the mid-sixties, Eileen Shanahan, a reporter for the New York Times, investigated the contributions of those who were on the Commerce Committee, particularly those who were leaders in the field of mutual-fund reform, and Harrison Williams and

(KEITH) Hasty Keith were the two members on whom she concentrated. I had received a total of \$1,750. Mind you, lots more money had been offered from time to time, but I had kept it at this minimum. Harrison Williams had received many thousands of dollars--as much as \$5,000 from one particular individual. But there our pictures were, side-by-side in the New York Times for having received substantial sums from the mutual-fund industry. Mine was \$1,750.

It was really a terrible shock to me, knowing how innocent I was and knowing how carefully I had screened contributions and how I had listed everything. You didn't have to list contributions from the federal point of view but the state of Massachusetts had a law that you had to list it, so I complied with the state statute. This was a blemish on my career that I think may have to some extent adversely affected my standing at the University of Vermont, where they saw my picture in the New York Times and thought, "Well, I guess we better not give him that honorary degree after all," if they ever thought they would. It had been suggested in 1959 or '60 by some friends of mine, I thought! They'll never see fit to do anything like that now."

Another side line on that, I was offered \$1,000 as an honorarium to speak to the Investment Company Institute. I did speak to them, but \$50 was all I would let them pay, because I didn't want an honorarium for that amount of money from people whom I was investigating. It was just as simple as that. Oren Harris on the other hand took, I think, \$3,000 for a talk that wasn't half as good! I just am glad to have that on the record. You ran across that New York Times story amongst the scrapbooks.

MORRISSEY: No I hadn't.

KEITH: It's in there somewhere.

MORRISSEY: Did that cause trouble for you in the district?

KEITH: No, the papers rallied to my cause. They said we know Keith and \$1,750 is not a significant amount of money - I did publish a statement for the papers, pointing out that I had been very careful to list everything, that I had fully complied with the state election laws, and that I had actually put limits on the amounts of monies I would accept from those with special interests. I had even, on occasion, given back money.

I might add that I maintained an open mind throughout the long four-year history of this mutual fund legislation. To be sure, I was ~~labeled~~ hard by the mutual fund interests,

Lobbied

(KEITH) as were all the members of the committee. However, I took the initiative to get the other side of the issue. My staff and I spent many hours getting the input from UN SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission]. Good arguments were made by both sides. (Incidentally, a member of my staff who worked on this legislation for me went to work for UN SEC in 1969. *Peter Sud* Obviously they were pleased with the thoroughness and objectivity with which we prepared his arguments). Ultimately, UN legislation passed the Congress in a form that was acceptable to both the SEC and the industry.

MORRISSEY: Let's talk about the district a little bit. It seems to me that it's divided in a number of ways. The city of New Bedford, Cape Cod itself, some of the Boston suburbs spilling in from the top. I guess in terms of TV coverage people listened to Boston and to Providence.

KEITH: And New Bedford.

MORRISSEY: And in reading the scrapbooks, I notice there are clippings in Polish, Portuguese, and in French, and I guess there's some Greek population. You had, I gather, an ethnic constituency with a lot of small towns.

KEITH: About fifty-five small towns. Brockton, which had been my home where I was brought up and comprised the majority of my senatorial district in the state senate, was not a part of my congressional district; so I only had the eight small towns that were in that senatorial district as a base. The Congressional district was originally Scotch and Irish but it had a number of minority groups, the largest of which were the Portuguese--about 75,000, I would say. The largest concentration of Portuguese was in New Bedford - but there were several thousand on the Cape and in Plymouth. In addition, almost every town had its Portuguese-American Club.

New Bedford had a large French population which had been Republican until the Roosevelt era. I had served in France during the war and I had studied some French and I courted the favor of the French people.

I went to a lovely high-school teacher and I told her that I had been invited to speak to the Franco-American Society in Fall River and would she help me with a few remarks. Her name was Yvonne Plourde. The president of the Society was a judge, La Joie, a bonafide Frenchman - of truly French extraction. For the most part the French people were from families who had come down to work in the mills of Fall River and New Bedford seventy-five years ago and their French was French-Canadian--not very good. But there was a respect among them for the Parisian French. When I was on Eisenhower's staff during World War II, I had been stationed in Paris for

(KEITH) a year and I had brushed up on my French. I have a limited vocabulary - but my accent was Parisian.

I can recall George Fingold, who was running for governor and was seated beside me, and Judge Le Joie, who was the master of ceremonies and a very impressive, delightful raconteur with a judicial mind, lending some dignity to the occasion. It was in a big ballroom. I said, "Messieurs et Mesdames. Je suis tres heureux d'etre ici ce soir. Il y a beaucoups des ans depuis je parle francais avec tout le monde francais, mais si vous voulez, j'espere que je parle en francais avec vous pour un moment. Avez-vous compris, George? (Little did they know that this bit of French had been planned and thoroughly rehearsed).

I said that to George Fingold, and the crowd just laughed. [Laughter.] So I really endeared myself to the French, and they said to me, "You know, this is the first time that's happened since [Henry] Cabot Lodge was down here years ago and we're so pleased to have you speak to us in our native tongue, even though we don't understand it." [Laughter.]

I mentioned earlier the primary fight where we had Besette, the Franco-American from New Bedford and we had Nat Tilden. The master of ceremonies at my dinner following the primary, when we got the Republicans together to forgive and forget and go on, was G. Leo Besette, the Franco-American who had been their candidate. He was a delightful master of ceremonies and a superb singer. He brought just the right flavor to it. So getting back to the ethnic aspects of my constituency, the Franco-Americans were in Keith's corner and I was very grateful for their support. I have some marvelous friends amongst them. I might add that when, on (primary) election night, Leo Besette only came in fourth, my daughter, Carolyn, was so saddened by his relatively poor showing that she could not restrain her tears!

MORRISSEY: How about the Portuguese?

KEITH: My first legislative assistant was Portuguese, Joe Vera, a Harvard and University of Virginia Law School graduate. His father had been a Republican clerk of courts. Joe is now with HEW in charge of their Boston effort to make sure that the rights of minorities are taken care of. My first permanent secretary after I went through the shuffle of first coming down here was Otilia Sylvia, an extraordinarily articulate and vivacious staff assistant who really did a magnificent job taking care of her congressman and his constituents. She was a very dominating personality whose devotion to duty set a high standard for the rest of the staff.

(KEITH) The Portuguese people in New Bedford have been highly integrated. They are doctors, lawyers, judges, dentists, and captains of the football teams. They're almost perfectly assimilated into the community. One of my prospective opponents was Edmund Dinnise, who was the fellow who failed to prosecute Edward Kennedy for the Chappaquiddick thing at the right time and then got in too late and botched it. He didn't get any good will out of it, because he hung back for a while and then he went in too hard. He was very well-educated, Harvard educated, *I think*.

MORRISSEY: So, I assume from that - that as an ethnic group, they didn't take any deliberate attention on your part?

KEITH: No. I did support strongly the amendments to the McCarren Act and there was a tremendous influx of Portuguese from about 1964 to '68 when we had thousands of them coming over. They were tremendously helpful to the community because of their work ethic and their family ties and their devotion to the church.

MORRISSEY: Hyannis Port was in your district.

KEITH: Oh, speaking of interesting constituents, *Daughter* I had not only the Kennedys, but I was always afraid that Bobby Kennedy might run against me.

MORRISSEY: Was there any truth to the rumor that he might?

KEITH: No, I don't believe so. His sights properly were set higher than that, but there is an interesting anecdote told to me by a man whose name escapes me at the moment. He had the respect of the Kennedy team and held a high position in the administration. He even had a summer home at Harwich.

One day while having a bull session in the president's office, after hours, perhaps six-thirty and having a drink, he asked, "What are you going to do, Mr. President, when you retire?" "Well, I think I'll go back to Cape Cod and run against Hasty Keith." Incidentally, my rapport with Jack Kennedy was quite good. At the time of his death I wrote his widow, Jackie, a very nice note and quoted from something that Roger Hillsman had said of Jack in one of his books. And I got the nicest reply from Jackie that you could possibly ask for. I don't know her personally, but she wrote much more than a perfunctory response to my letter.

There was one interesting anecdote that I resented a little bit. The president was flying back and forth to my constituency on Air Force One and landing at Otis Air Force

(KEITH) Base. He had asked me once, at a meeting, if I would like to fly up to Cape Cod with him. He had suggested that at a meeting during which we were discussing the Cape Cod National Seashore, "Hasty, if sometime you would like a ride up in Air Force One let me know." Not long thereafter I thought "Gee, that would be nice to have my two daughters, Helen and Carolyn, come out and meet me at Otis Air Force Base with their mother and see me get off the plane with the president. And so I called over to the White House and I said to the congressional liaison officer that I would like to avail myself of this opportunity and accept the president's offer. "Well, Hasty, I'll see if we can arrange it. By the way, how do you feel about the foreign aid bill?" And that so turned me off, I don't think it should have, I don't think he meant it in the way he said it, but I really did resent it at the time, and I didn't accept the invitation. I felt he was asking a quid pro quo.

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BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE II

He felt he knew me well enough to ask me how I felt. He was not hoping to change my mind, but at the moment the foreign aid bill was in trouble and he needed my vote and he probably was going to get it. I guess I was overly sensitive, I'm sorry now that I was.

I would like to say just in passing that in spite of my much more conservative approach to fiscal matters than that of Jack or Bob, I was very much affected by the early morning news the day after Bobby Kennedy was shot. I was touched more by that than by most other deaths that have hit me hard.

I don't know that this really belongs in this framework but nevertheless I think I'd like to mention it. My district, under the influence of the Boston Globe, was becoming more and more hostile towards the Vietnam War, and so I became much more interested, because I wanted to be sure I was on the right track. I went over there at the time of the incursion into Cambodia.

We had before Congress a resolution pending to decide whether or not we would enlarge the war by some sort of more formal recognition of it by Congress. Incidentally, I voted against expanding the war effort to include action against North Vietnam in Cambodia on a search and destroy effort. But, anyway, I went over there. I had a constituent by the name of George Casey who commanded the division that conducted the whole incursionary effort. He came from Situate, which

political

(KEITH) is the home of Bob Healy who was the editor of the Boston Globe. I asked Major General Casey, who at the time perhaps was thirty-eight or forty years of age - a very attractive guy--I said to him, "Tell me, how do you feel about this effort? Has it been worthwhile?"

He said, "I think it was probably the best thing that President Nixon has done so far as the war effort is concerned." And I said, "You know, you are making a foreign-policy judgment and at the same time you're making a military comment. How do you feel justified to get into the field of foreign policy?" And he said, "Well, Mr. Keith, I have my masters from Harvard in international relations and my doctorate from Columbia and I've been to the army and navy staff course at Leavenworth and I'm a graduate of the War College and I have had theater-level assignments as well as those in Washington at the highest levels in the policy-planning area."

And I said, "My hat's off to you. I'm glad that you've had that background and I respect your judgment. It helps me in my voting." About three weeks later I was driving down Massachusetts Avenue one morning at about seven-thirty, maybe eight o'clock. It was time for the news and I heard over the radio that Major General George Casey was killed that day as he piloted his helicopter into the side of a mountain on his way to report to a headquarters meeting in Da Nang.

As I mentioned in the case of Bobby Kennedy, that death hit me hard. Casey was really one of the great people that crossed my life in state moreso perhaps than most any of the members. I just thought it was an appropriate little anecdote, one of the fringe benefits of being a congressman.

MORRISSEY: Of all the people you've served with in the Congress, which ones impressed you the most?

KEITH: Well, I think, you ought to almost let me think about that a second. I'm reminded a little bit of when Eisenhower was asked by the press why he was endorsing Nixon. Eisenhower made what at the time appeared to be the foolish statement, "Give me a couple of weeks to think about it and I'll let you know." (In retrospect it was not so foolish!)

There are a lot of members of Congress whom I respect very much, and they run a very wide gamut. I respect people who, you know, get up early in the morning and get down to the office and answer their constituent mail. They're serving a public purpose. I respect those members of Congress who ignore their mail almost and spend their time worrying about national or international affairs.

(KEITH) It's hard to say whom I respect the most, whom I did respect the most. I wouldn't say it was the leadership in my own party. I respected John McCormack very much. I don't respect O'Neill. I have affection for him, but I think he's a political animal. A delight, loyal, but not what we need nor what the Democratic party needs. I don't think, maybe I'm just prejudiced on this, but I don't think John Rhodes is what we need. He's not a follow-through guy.

MORRISSEY: A follow-through guy?

KEITH: Yes.

MORRISSEY: What do you mean by "follow-through"?

KEITH: Well, I was on the Defense Manpower Commission and saw a chance to be its chairman and he promised his support. I asked him first if he thought I was qualified to play that role and if I could do a good job, and his answers being in the affirmative, I then asked him to help me and he agreed to do so, but didn't. But, [Hugh D.] Scott controlled it and I have very little respect for Scott. I think he's an operator. I have respect for people like Anchel Nelson who was the senior Republican on the District of Columbia Committee. I have respect for the Republican leader on the Commerce Committee, Bill [William L.] Springer.

There are some people who have an ability to absorb all of the factors that are necessary in the decision-making process and reach a decision that is truly mature and in the public interest. These are the ones for whom I have respect. They oftentimes are not the ones that get the press. They're not the provocative ones. They're not the mavericks. They're the ones that do their homework. Their personalities don't stand out. They would perhaps not be known or recognized on the national scene but they would be respected by their colleagues for doing their homework. Peter Frelinghuysen, for example, Walter Judd, Brooks Hays, Mo [Morris] Udall, Stu [Stewart] Udall, Brock Adams, I don't necessarily agree with them, but I think they do their homework. And I think that the judgments that they render are in the public interest as they see it and are honestly arrived at. Whereas there are some people, who even in the state senate as in the Congress would say when we reached a party position, "Oh, I promised Ted so and so of the such and such labor union that I would give him a vote on this one. I'm sorry fellows, I've got to be off."

This would be in a caucus. Anybody who has been in politics any length of time knows that if you make commitments before it's time to vote, you've lost your bargaining

(KEITH) power. People, who time after time vote a political constituency rather than having the courage to vote their convictions or the convictions of the party of which they are a member, don't have my respect. It's a two-way thing. I have respect for their ability to play handball and to get elected, but there aren't many towers of strength in the Congress, because their strength is drained by the demands of the day.

MORRISSEY: And I would assume, the demand of running every two years.

KEITH: Yes, I'd say I have tremendous respect for John Byrnes, Wilbur Mills, and yet, I know each of them had their weaknesses even from their legislative point of view. On the 1 percent add on, which was costing so many hundreds of billions of dollars neither Wilbur Mills nor John Byrnes was very responsive to this problem. John Byrnes was retired, but he didn't even know what it was when I talked to him about doing something about it.

The committee system is the best system, but by golly, its got to be watched--and the individuals that shape the committee decisions are the ones that count. The ones for whom I have respect are those that know the subject and render an objective analysis.

MORRISSEY: Since you represented the district next door to Joe Martin's district, could you tell me your impressions of Joe Martin?

KEITH: My judgments on him would be flavored by the fact that I knew him slightly for many years prior to running for office and yet never knew him well enough as a legislator. I think he was a political scientist but not a legislator in that he was a great man at compromise and getting things done and probably made a very good appraisal as to the political and social and even economic impact of the legislation. A great judge of character and competency. I suspect he never wasted his time studying the detail of legislation and if he had he wouldn't have been the leader that he was. I think he was probably the right man for the job that he had but he hung on to it too long.

MORRISSEY: One of the first things you had to confront early in 1959 was the race between [Charles] Halleck and Martin.

KEITH: That was a rough decision, but not knowing Halleck and knowing Joe [Martin], he got my vote. I can't conceive of my having any problem over the vote. There are

(KEITH) a great many things on which the vote turns other than just who the Speaker is. There are, for example, committee assignments and your ability to further the interest of your constituency by getting assigned to those committees.

I'll say this, one of the nice things about the average legislative body is that generally, any ill will caused by the way you vote is not held against you. There's very little vindictiveness. It's always, "Well, there's always tomorrow." I had great respect for Johnson, for Kennedy, for Joe Martin. Charlie Halleck and others shared that philosophy, and for that I respected him. You lose some, but there's always another one coming along.

MORRISSEY: In '65, before the Halleck-Ford contest, how did you line up?

KEITH: That's where I line up with Halleck. I think I mentioned that earlier, because Halleck was better at articulating the issues involved and I think he was really more profound. At least he knew there were some communists in Poland. Jerry's an awfully nice guy, and I think, in the last analysis he'd make decisions with the country's best interest in mind; but I don't think his judgment would be as well-formed or as balanced as Halleck's.

MORRISSEY: Would you recount for me your conversation with Ford on the floor of the House at the time the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was being voted on?

KEITH: I am, as you know, an army reservist, a colonel. I served on the European theater staff in World War II. I had some input into our implementation of the cross-channel operations. As a student at the command and staff school, I was conscious of the basic principles of war. I had learned them darn well under the tutelage of Elbridge Colby who had taught at the University of Vermont. Incidentally, when I was on theater staff I questioned some of the policies-- Some of the decisions under which the chiefs, even Ike were operating.

I questioned Ford on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in the well of the House. I sat there and listened to the debate - and, while he was down there, I questioned his judgment in encouraging support for the resolution. I said, "Jerry, I think we're making a mistake. First, it's going to be a difficult thing from a public-relations point of view. We're going to, perhaps, lose in the court of world opinion, the United Nations, and perhaps elsewhere. Secondly, our lines of communication from a technical and professional point of view are not going to be too good. Most importantly we have an uptight economy and if you add a war effort on top

(KEITH) of it, it's going to be very inflationary. And finally, you know, we just might not win. This could be a French and Indian type war all over again where they're sniping at you from the jungles and retreating into the thickets." And he said, "Well, Hastings, you may be right about the first three, but certainly we can win it."

It's sort of interesting that sometime later--oh, anyhow, I went and voted as he wanted me to--sometime later I wanted a letter sent to the chairman of the Republican National Committee that would have shown my perception of these events back at the time of the creation of the problem. So, I asked Jerry if he would mind sending a letter to, I think it was Rogers Morton, listing these things; and he said, "Sure, Hastings, you write the letter and I'll sign it." So I wrote it just as we've described it and he signed it just as I wrote it. And I can't really imagine his signing it. I think he didn't even read it. And this was the same kind of thing that I found with reference to the marine sanctuaries bill. He was a great one to pledge his support for a particular effort. He seldom questioned you about the long-range consequences or the pros and cons.

MORRISSEY: Do you mean Morton or Ford?

KEITH: Ford. Speaking of Morton, Morton made a commitment to come up and speak in my district for me, and then when he learned that William B⁷ Weeks was my prospective opponent he went back on his commitment. "We never get involved in primary fights, Hastings." And that burned me up. He was right, but he shouldn't have said he would in the first place. I knew that it would be very hard for him to do, because Weeks had been very active in the drafting of Eisenhower and so too had Morton and particularly his older brother, Thruston.

MORRISSEY: Let me back up on some things we touched on a moment ago. Why do you feel the Boston⁷ Globe was hostile to you? And after that I'm going to ask you why do you feel the Globe spread peace sentiment in your district and how did that affect you politically? But take the first one first.

KEITH: Well, the Globe is a liberal paper. They are really the Washington Post of New England. And by and large I don't have too much quarrel with their being the Washington Post of New England. The thing that irritated the hell out of me--and also other members of Congress, both Democrat and Republican--was that they just didn't bother to do their homework. They were above all eager for a story.

(KEITH) I heard Jimmy Burke saying the other day and I've heard Tip O'Neill say on occasion that the Globe doesn't watch the day-to-day activity. They're not really interested in the legislative process. They're interested in social causes. They're most interested in redistribution of the wealth through welfare programs. They don't really try to track the legislative process whereby ideas become laws. That work is done in the committee rooms. They never came to my office except to try and smoke out something that was critical of me.

When, for example, I came back from Vietnam in 1970, they sent Tom Winship, the editor of the Globe, down to interview me. During the conversation he asked some questions and of course I answered them, but when the story was written, only half the story was told. If I wanted to take a few minutes of time I could give you the nuts-and-bolts - the specifics of it, but the slanting of the story was such that it cast me in an unfavorable light rather than being at all objective.

They have a cartoonist whose work you may have seen somewhere in my stuff. A man by the name of Zepp. Have you ever seen any of his cartoons?

MORRISSEY: I don't recall them specifically.

KEITH: Well, you'd never forget them. He's the kind of guy who does them in stark black and white. One of them, for example, shows Governor [John A.] Volpe putting some black hair tonic on his head. It shows me with a little pail of goodies voting for Nixon's programs and getting my crumbs. Very clever, very devastating. I don't resent them. It's part of the game. You get so you even enjoy the humor; but I don't like to have news columns slanted.

MORRISSEY: Why was the Globe hostile to you in your district?

KEITH: They wanted to elect a Democrat. Period. If they couldn't have a Democrat they wanted a liberal Republican. Frankly, they don't consider me to be, and I'm not any great intellect. I think they would rather have a [Kenneth] Galbraith than a /Calvin/ Coolidge, even though the times may merit a Coolidge. A Galbraith could talk in those stentorian tones about very sophisticated problems. His judgment might be terrible, but at least he was educated and informed, and they would be inclined to understand his mind set.

MORRISSEY: Did you sense this threat of anti-war sentiment in your district?

KEITH: I was very much surprised that it didn't get started earlier than it did. Back in the early stages in the war in Vietnam I got a petition from the Junior Chamber of Commerce of Cape Cod with some five thousand signatures asking me to really go all out to defend the free enterprise system the democratic system of the United States against the communist threat in Vietnam. I had some reservations. They wanted me to present that to the White House with some fanfare and so forth. And it hung around my desk for months. I finally mailed it over to the president. The initial feeling of my constituents, amongst the leadership, the hard-headed businessmen, was that this was a simple matter of communism. A violation of a treaty. We should, they said, come down hard on them. But, then as it became harder and harder to win, they changed their thinking. This always nauseated me in a way. On the other hand, I would have these, I'm going to call them do-gooders, come into my office asking me to stop the killing

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BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE III

and I'd say, "Well, you know, many a good cause has taken lives, and if in the long run it means a better life for the rest of the world, I think those people haven't died in vain." I believe we've made a commitment and we ought to live up to it."

I will give you one humorous side, and this isn't the funniest thing that ever happened to me, but it's one of the most interesting. There was in the midst of the Vietnam war debate a group of liberals - particularly amongst the clergy, the United Church of Christ, of which I am a member, and members of the Catholic clergy and Episcopalians in particular - that formed within my district. They were coming down to straighten out my thinking. I had, after all, a district with a lot of intellectual interests, Unitarian-church types.

The leader of this delegation was, I believe, the *Unitarian* minister for the Old Ship Church in Hingham. It's built, I think, of remnants of a ship that foundered. It may even have been mislead onto the shoals, I don't know. It has a very lovely interior, the pulpit, I think, might have been of a prow of a vessel. I haven't been there, but I've heard a lot about it. It's quite famous. They were going to meet

(KEITH) with members of the leadership but they were going to call on me first because I was the most loyal supporter of the war effort. John McCormack was as I recall, the only other one who shared by belief. (Incidentally, I'll venture a guess that I was the only one to question the vote in the first place!)

When I heard they were coming, I called back to Hingham to find out a little bit about the leader. My informant said, "Well, you might be interested to know, Hastings, just two or three weeks ago he announced from the pulpit, with his wife and children in attendance, that he was divorcing his wife and going to marry another parishioner who was also in the audience. He's not really as highly regarded in his community as he might be." I've had domestic difficulties, but I felt that, for better or for worse, I had a commitment and I should live up to it. Old fashioned but there's too much disregard for institutions - either church or state.

So in comes this man and his entourage. In response to his question, I said "Well, you know, I look at this thing as sort of a commitment, like a marriage vow. You know, before you get married, you take into consideration the responsibilities into which you're entering and you promise for better or for worse. We've had our debate on Vietnam, and maybe we're married to a sleazy lady, South Vietnam; but we've told the rest of society and Southeast Asia, in particular - and throughout the world - about this. Just because we can't win we shouldn't walk out on it. We're going to stick by this. They're counting on us, and that's the way I feel about Vietnam. I think it's just a commitment that we've made and we've got to live up to it, just like one's marriage vows. There are other commitments of this nature. How do you feel about it?" He felt that maybe there was some merit to my position, but he wasn't sure but what these things were negotiable. [Laughter.]

Now, we're doing this for anybody who has the patience to listen to it, and I've gotten this far. What would I like to have them remember? I sit here and see my daughter Helen's picture up there. Her husband went to Vietnam and left her at home with a child and a job. She didn't believe in Vietnam. They became estranged and divorced. She's wrapped up in a commune-like child day-care center in Burlington, Vermont helping to take care of other people's children, as well as her own. She and her former husband (a conventional type) are friends, and the children went to the day-care center she directs.

But the war in Vietnam caused all kinds of turbulence, and this was one of the byproducts. She reexamined the

(KEITH) worthwhile nature of her existence and decided it was wanting and gave up a good job at the University of Vermont as the assistant to the vice-president for development. And now, incidentally, her husband has some of those responsibilities. She's running the day-care center sort of like a commune, all these things were taking place, (I'm sort of meandering here). I can remember going by a group of people who were sort of picketing my house - sitting on the fence near my home. As I'd walk by they'd say, (in a loud whisper) "SST./Supersonic Transport/ SST. Vietnam War. Vietnam War." It was rough on the politician - and rough on the young people, too.

But the point that I started to make as I looked up at my daughter's picture on the wall is that she had come down for election night in 1970. It was a tight one, as you know. I was just behind by about, oh, maybe a hundred votes at three o'clock in the morning and only Hingham to come in. Hingham is a very sophisticated community. They stop counting votes at eleven and would come in at eight and do it--not at time-and-a-half--they'd do it during the course of the day without inconveniencing anybody--the clerks or the people who were doing the counting--so all the state was waiting for their returns. I went to bed, but the press hung around and my daughter hung around too, waiting for Hingham to come in. About 8:30 the vote from Hingham was phoned in, my daughter, who had been tabulating the returns, and the press were standing around waiting for them. So, in came Hingham. And, of course, it's a Republican community. They didn't want to have their next-door neighbor, Cohasset, (which was something of a rival) to have the congressman from the neighboring town - so I carried Hingham by about 2,000 votes, and won by about 1,500, and my daughter said, "Well, daddy, you won. But you've got to change!" and she gave me a great big kiss. There was the press and there was my daughter kissing me. The headlines the next day were: "Daddy, you won, but you've got to change." It made a point - but I don't think I'll change. The pendulum will have to swing.

I don't think I have changed. I'm still as much concerned about the problems of the youth as I ever was - and about education, and the realities of today's lifestyles, its responsibilities and opportunities, and about the global nuclear power, the problems in the Middle East (and we have a chapter there we haven't gone into--OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries])

But I still don't believe a democracy can survive unless it has a sound fiscal base on which to build, and I still agree with the economist[philosopher] named [Joseph A]

(KEITH) Schumpeter, who wrote in the 1920s that if we weren't careful, democracies would be the death of themselves, because they would vote for those members of parliament or members of Congress who did the most for their constituents rather than keeping the proper balance--or, as Edmund Burke said, with "the national interest"--in mind.

I think, as we become more constituency-oriented, rather than country-oriented, we're going to have deterioration of the system, and we can spend ourselves into a form of bankruptcy, as we have where the debt service is such that inflation is built in. We ask the government to do more, which means borrow more, which means more interest, which means higher cost of doing business, which means more inflation and more welfare. It's just an insidious spiral of inflation that will require more and more government control. Eventually the individual will have to succumb to the state to an even larger degree. And unless we resist and reverse this trend, we're in for some very difficult times.

That's perhaps not a note on which to end, but you may recall that I showed you, I think, earlier today, something on my forecast of the energy crisis - that was in the late sixties, long before people had even heard of OPEC countries. I was going there and writing about them then.

MORRISSEY: What prompted that early interest?

KEITH: Well, I was on the Commerce Committee, and the subcommittee, of which I was the senior Republican, was known as the commerce and finance subcommittee. It was going to consider No-fault Insurance legislation. I own a substantial chunk of an insurance agency and was afraid that I would be accused of conflict of interest if I sat in judgment on that committee. So I said to John Moss, who was its chairman, "I'm going to request Harley Staggers to give me a new committee assignment, because, as you know, John, I own a substantial chunk of an insurance agency and I might be accused of conflict of interest, no matter what my objectivity." He said, "Hastings, I'm sorry you feel you have to do this. I've always felt that your private knowledge was used in the public's interest, and we need to have the private knowledge that you have." I said, "Well, it isn't really that great, because I'm essentially a life-insurance man anyway, but the public might think it was, and I'm going to go ahead with it. But I appreciate the compliment."

So I then chose the communications and power subcommittee, and I became the senior Republican. It had,

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(KEITH) amongst other things, public broadcasting; and if you read my remarks on public broadcasting in the Congressional Record, you will find about my concern as to what use it has been and could be put. They did a two or three-hour documentary on Tip O'Neill about a month ago. Made him appear like a "hell of a fella" on public broadcasting, in the midst of a campaign. Sure he doesn't have a chance of losing, but they shouldn't do it. And you can imagine what [Franklin] Roosevelt would have done with the destroyer thing in 1940 or '41. It's a tool, and we have to be on guard against it.

At any rate, I sought that committee assignment, and in 1970 (before receiving the actual assignment) I went to a conference at Johnson College in Vermont. It was the first conference that I know of in which both the environmentalists and the industrialists participated. There was Dave Freeman, Stu Udall, and the president of Continental Edison. There were nuclear power people, engineers and environmentalists, public interest groups, [Ralph] Nader representatives and Hastings Keith.

And I went abroad and on my return, wrote a report called Over a Barrel. It was concerned about what would happen if one of these Middle Eastern countries that I had just visited, one of these OPEC countries, were to turn off its oil supply - or if they were to do so in concert. I came back and I called the White House and talked with Jim Atkins, the top man on energy policy and oil. He later became our ambassador to Saudi Arabia. I said, "I'm more concerned about this, turning off the spigot, than I am about the possibility of mining Haiphong Harbor." And he said, "Oh, Hastings, they wouldn't dare - we'd move in in a minute." That was probably a year-and-a-half before they did turn off the spigot.

But New England's dependence on oil was, as you probably remember, extraordinarily high. I had been very much interested not only in OPEC, but in ~~residential~~ oil. My office did much of the original work for which Saltonstall's office got credit. We were paying \$3 a barrel for it in 1965, and we were paying \$10 a barrel for it in 1971, and that was what was used for schools and hospitals. Now I may be wrong about the figures, but it had been something that had been very much of concern to me from both a domestic point of view and from a global politics point of view for a long time.

"residential"

MORRISSEY: Going back to 1970 where you had the tough primary and then the tough campaign afterwards against Studds, I'm confused, because on the one hand some people seemed to be against you within the Republican party because you were too liberal; others were against you because you were too conservative. Apparently, Weeks came at you because he felt you were too conservative. Was there some anti-war sentiment in there also?

KEITH: Oh, yes. You know, we're now in the midst of a campaign for governor of Massachusetts, and the man who won the Democratic nomination frankly said, "What I do is I put all the hate groups together - the people who were against abortion and the people who were against busing and the people who were for capital punishment." Well, what one does is put the hate groups together - the people who are elected oftentimes are elected on a negative thing. Chris Herter wasn't elected governor. Dever was defeated because Dever lost his voice at the convention in 1952. It's little things like that. So what Weeks was doing was, wherever there was somebody that was critical of Keith because he was too liberal, Weeks told him, "Well, I'm more conservative," and if somebody wanted me to be the other way, well, Weeks played that one. Obviously, after a while in office, you end up with people who are unhappy with you. But my greatest resentment over Weeks' campaign is that he conducted such a dumb one as to lose the primary for himself and yet made it difficult, to say the least, for me to win the election.

*and Dick
Signing the
bill giving
Tip O'Neil
a pension*

MORRISSEY: So why was the run-off against Studds as close as it was?

KEITH: Because the Democrats, who had been moderates, became convinced that I was too conservative, and because of the anti-Vietnam War sentiment. I think that the anti-Vietnam War sentiment was probably the biggest factor. I did much better on the Cape and in New Bedford than I did on the outskirts of Boston. I had some very powerful names against me - but, on the other hand I had some powerful people with me. On the whole I think I would match my friends against theirs. Further I suspect they weren't sure enough to be sure.

MORRISSEY: Yeah, but they're basically summer people, aren't they?

KEITH: Yes and no. Many of them are retirees. They live there except in the winter when they go to Florida.

MORRISSEY: In other words, celebrities getting prominent space in the media.

KEITH: Yes. But I'll say this for them, they did not play as strong a role as I might have expected. There were a few of them who did get involved. Kurt Vonnegut is a year-around resident. His wife and some of the others were actively against me and contributed to Studds' campaign. In this respect, an interesting thing took place. A former vice-president of the Ford Motor Company, who had been Governor [Robert F.] Bradford's executive assistant, went to Dartmouth with Sinclair Weeks--he had a little party for me and then a month later had a party for Weeks. I asked, "What the hell's going on here, Charlie? What are you doing supporting Weeks and me, too?" "Well, how could I help it, Hastings? Week's father called me and said, 'come on now, we went to Dartmouth together, go ahead and have a party for Billie, too.'" [Laughter.]

MORRISSEY: It all seems so incredible because in '68 you were unopposed, and you ran up that huge plurality (the biggest one in the nation, I guess, that year), and Studds was vulnerable, but there you were, and suddenly fighting for your life.

KEITH: I didn't fight for my life. I was in a fight. I didn't overreact to it. I didn't get out of character. There wasn't any particular defection of the Weeks' supporters. They all felt the district had to stay Republican. They wanted to support me. But I tell you, a quarter of a million dollars in the primary, plus a quarter of a million dollars in the election following, was an awful lot of money to combat, and they both ran on the same theme.

Now the SST was a very important issue in that campaign, and the war in Vietnam, and I can, of course, understand their frustration at my support of these issues. My answer to the SST was, amongst other answers, that the clipper ship had undergone the same hazards. The British were losing trade to the Americans because of our preeminence in the clipper ship, and so the British came up with the packet. The packet didn't carry as much cargo but it made a much faster run. And for the next generation, they were succeeding in sea transport. Further than this I was present when Geeb Halaby told Oren Harris and [Warren G.] Magnuson that if we didn't come up with a supersonic transport, Pan Am and the rest of the American worldwide air transport industry would lose out to the French and the English with the Concorde.

I think the British and French made the wrong decision, but I have a feeling that with the SST, as we were designing it with twice the cargo capacity, we would have succeeded where the French and British failed. I believe they have

(KEITH) failed. I think it's a deficit operation that is being sustained by their governments, but the environmental impact was not adverse; the grounds against it were not bona fide. I will say this, there was one ground against it that I do object to, and that was the government subsidy. I think it was at first a half a billion dollars, and then I noticed in reading the Congressional Quarterly, the final estimate as to the costs - and they were much higher. It was, on review, a bad vote, one in which the committee procedure was put aside.

Just recently I saw a history of Studds in the Congressional Quarterly, and it referred to me as a gray personality. I think one becomes a bright personality when first running for Congress and you come in with new ideas and a new personality, a new character, a new point of view. And then you get in and you are confronted by the hard realities and the day-to-day work, and one gets so concerned with the issues for which you have the responsibility, that one realizes there are two sides to a question. You can't just go off on a tangent and be critical. Your points of view become moderated, and you become a gray personality. That's what the Boston Globe felt the fight was about. Studds was a bright, fresh, new face running against the graying personality or character.

Anyhow, I feel I could have won the next go-around by changing. You know, by accepting the challenge, but it would have meant, as my daughter said, "change" not only to some extent in my voting, but more importantly, I would have had to change in my devotion to my wife (a very sick woman, and one whom I loved dearly), and I would have had to do the errand-boy work. The alternative was to take a pension of \$1560 a month for the rest of my life and go to work in something that would have had some parameters to it. I had never been able to concentrate or reflect - and this was my chance, I thought, to gracefully do just that.

MORRISSEY: Isn't that one of the greatest frustrations confronting a congressman?

KEITH: Yes. I'm not sure that all of them appreciate it because most of them thrive on being errand boys. Well, the fella who licked - (who's one of the best authors on the American scene today, just wrote the book on the Eastern shore)?

MORRISSEY: Oh, James Michener.

KEITH: Yes. He ran for Congress against a very low-key, indifferent--absolutely lacking in any sparkle whatsoever--incumbent congressman - a very nice guy - but all he did was go in like the man in "McNamara's Band" playing at wakes and

(KEITH) weddings, and fancy balls - picnics - that kind of thing. He was just all over the district and I suspect talking trivia from start to finish - never involved in a philosophical discussion or in the resolving of differences in legislation. The incumbent congressman won heavily over Michener. He never talked issues - was never involved in legislative problems. He, the incumbent, seldom came to any committee meetings - but he answered his mail - he went home every weekend to "politic." His committee is still struggling with a plant siting bill - ten years later. Well, this nice guy couldn't care less. All he wanted to do was get reelected, and he was reelected against a chap like Michener. (It seems to me we ought to end on a better note than we are. We're sort of drifting off.)

MORRISSEY: [Chuckle] Well, let me ask you this. Did you have any forewarning that redistricting was going to take the form that it did take?

KEITH: Oh, yes. Sure.

MORRISSEY: Did you see it coming?

KEITH: Yes. The redistricting thing was a very interesting chapter. I guess I was old and tired in a way, but I knew I wasn't going to run.

MORRISSEY: When had you made that decision?

KEITH: Oh, I'd made that decision -- I guess probably at the time I was running for reelection in '70. Not so much that I didn't care. In fact, one of the things I would have done if I had run for reelection was I would have run against the gerrymandering, I would have made it an issue, but I'm not much good at that.

The original redistricting plan called for me to get some good towns and to lose Dartmouth, which was part of the New Bedford area and where the Southeastern Massachusetts University was, and which was a hotbed of student activity at that time. Some very interesting fights were taking place between the reactionary or at least conservative president, attracting nationwide attention, and the student body that was up in rebellion. Margaret Heckler just stamped her foot and said, she would not take the town of Dartmouth, she had enough colleges in her district. She screamed to beat hell to the redistricting committee.

END SIDE 1, TAPE III

BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE III

(KEITH) I wasn't running for reelection. I didn't care that much.

MORRISSEY: Oh, really?

KEITH: And Weeks didn't care that much either. The district could have gone Republican. Weeks only lost it by 1,500.

MORRISSEY: In '72.

KEITH: Yes. Weeks could have won if he hadn't been so dumb as to tell the people that he wanted the Judiciary Committee instead of Merchant Marine and Fisheries (and I just use that as an illustration). His judgments were like that in many respects.

MORRISSEY: So what I hear you saying is that you didn't oppose the way it came out?

KEITH: I did oppose, but I didn't scream and holler. It was not a bad district. It was winnable.

MORRISSEY: The one theory that comes through in a clipping in the scrapbooks is that the three so-called liberal Republican members of Congress from Massachusetts: [Silvio] Conte, Brad Morse and Margaret Heckler, were willing to sacrifice your district.

KEITH: [Pause.] Oh, I wouldn't say that - Brad Morse was retiring. He quit in the middle of the year to take the job at the UN [United Nations], and he knew he was going to quit. I guess he was involved in the redistricting, but he didn't much care, but he did want to keep the district Republican. I thought Weeks could take the district, and he could have.

I didn't fight it, particularly. I was spending my time over at the White House trying to get them to create a department on energy policy. I was testifying before the Congress that they needed to have an energy policy. I don't suppose that my vote counted or any one individual congressman's vote counted much as to whether or not the nation had an energy policy. Without an energy policy you won't have the private-sector planning that is necessary. There would just be too many imponderables.

But, to answer your question about Margaret Heckler - I think she did foul up the good plan that everybody agreed upon. It was shown to me, and my seat would have stayed Republican--for Weeks or for me had the plan been followed.

MORRISSEY: Going back to when you first came to Congress, how earnestly did you work for the two major committee assignments that you had?

KEITH: I didn't get the second one until sometime after I had been given the Commerce one.

MORRISSEY: The second one being the . . .

KEITH: Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

MORRISSEY: Is that the one you came hoping to get?

KEITH: No. I didn't ask for it. I wanted the Commerce Committee. I didn't at first realize the significance of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee assignment or how useful it would be in my campaigns, but I made it a big thing while I was on the committee. You know, Studds is generally given credit for the two-hundred mile limit bill, but they have forgotten an equally important bill was the nine-mile fishery zone (enacted in the very early sixties, I think). I was the leader in the effort to pass this legislation. Up until that time the Soviets could have come within three miles of our shoreline, but we added nine more miles to it in the way of a fishery zone for fish propagation purposes and conservation. I was very proud of that.

I was also proud of the fact that in 1956 they had authorized flood insurance, and I nudged that along for a long, long, long while. It was not before any committee on which I served, but the authorization was there, and they didn't pass that legislation until about '61 or '62. I don't think you saw any reference to it in the scrapbooks, but the insurance companies would not insure existing structures in areas that were flood prone. Following the '54 hurricane or hurricanes, we did get some legislation through authorizing the National Flood Insurance Plan and it was finally implemented, I'd say in '62 or '63, with gentle pressure from me right along. And the other thing that I'm very proud of is this marine sanctuary legislation. Most congressmen don't have as much luck with legislation as I did. I think the record should also show that the New England congressional team worked closely together.

MORRISSEY: I was going to ask you about that.

KEITH: And Eddy [Edward P.] Boland was particularly good about projects in which I had a particular interest.

MORRISSEY: Was he chairman of the New England caucus?

KEITH: No. We didn't have a chairman of the caucus as such, but he was on the Appropriations Committee and very senior. Plymouth wanted a breakwater, and I worked very hard

(KEITH) to get it. I did get it. There's no doubt in my mind but that it wouldn't have been in there except for Eddie Boland, and he wouldn't have done it except that I had importuned him from time to time. It cost \$4 million. I don't think it's ever been really recognized by the town of Plymouth. The same thing is true for many other public works projects - Princetown Harbor, etc. I am by nature the kind of person who goes after something and if it begins to roll on its own, I'll move on to something else.

Medicare is another thing about which I'm proud. I was the first Republican member of Congress to support it.

MORRISSEY: I was going to ask you about that.

KEITH: The Washington Post ran a front page story on it - and the papers in the district gave it a big play. I had been an insurance man in private life - and I knew that no company could successfully fill the need for a policy such as would be provided under Medicare. No insurance company could possibly tell how much to charge for a policy of this sort. Hospital costs were going up too fast, largely because of the inflation and similarly, no individual could possibly tell during his working years when he was going to die or of what illness. He might have to save for a lingering illness or he might go because of a heart attack. So the only way to solve his problem was the "pay-as-you-go, user's tax" in the form of Medicare - a perfectly sound republican concept, I might add.

I had been asked to go on Channel 2, representing the Republican point of view, in Boston in about 1961, and there was the president of AMA [American Medical Association] of Massachusetts, a labor leader and myself. The president of the AMA thought he had a cohort until I came out strongly for Medicare on this program - and all hell broke loose.

The Republican members of the Massachusetts delegation really gave me a hard time because I had been more venturesome than they. I had embarrassed them, and so Conte and Brad Morse and Bill Bates actually took me into a private room at a private luncheon and gave me hell for coming out for Medicare at such an early time. Conte was doing it all the time in the [Massachusetts] state senate and in the Congress and yet they took me to task for doing so. I felt there was no other way to handle it - it was the conservative thing to do - the only way that a retiree could possibly meet the costs of major illness and still maintain his own private savings against other more foreseeable emergencies.

MORRISSEY: Did that boil up the doctors in your district against you?

KEITH: Yes. I caught hell from them too. They had been strong supporters, and I had to confront them, particularly the Medical Society in New Bedford, and thank the Lord for one little Irishman who rallied to my support. You know, ten years later they were all for it. They were making out alright - in fact so well that when I put out a questionnaire on national health insurance in about 1968, the town voted most heavily for national health insurance--I think it was 64 percent, it may have been more--with Dartmouth. There you have a lot of Portuguese, poor people, immigrants, and they see the doctors going by on their way to the yacht club in their great big cars, or playing golf on the course which is adjacent to the town - I think largely because of this the town of Dartmouth was strongly in favor of national health insurance. I suspect because of contrast in the two groups of people - rich and poor. It may be a harbinger of things to come - Things that can get out of control. But this doesn't mean I shouldn't have led the fight (in the Republican party) for this.

MORRISSEY: You voted for repeal of 14B in Taft-Hartley?

KEITH: Yes. This is probably the toughest question that I had, both politically and conscience-wise. I sometimes wonder about the logic - both political and otherwise - in that vote. I did write a letter to the Boston Herald, which was published. Did you see that in there on that subject?

MORRISSEY: I can't remember.

KEITH: Well, the issue had appeared on a referendum in Massachusetts and it had carried in my district rather heavily. Further than that, it was confirmed by Senator [Robert] Taft's son, Bob, that his father had pledged to the unions that he would fight for repeal, and he (Bob Taft) felt that it was a good vote. His father, in an effort to win passage of Taft-Hartley, had to make a concession on 14(b) - and promised leaders in the Congress and in the labor movement that he would vote for repeal of this particular provision. I don't know today how I would vote on it, and I don't know whether it was a good vote then. I can't, now, for the life of me, tell you why I voted this way. It's my general recollection that the South has an advantage over the North - and that, by voting for repeal, the unions movement would be strengthened in the South. We have been losing a great many manufacturers to the South. This would help to stop it.

MORRISSEY: But having had that, implicit, at least, labor support in '58, it probably didn't hurt you?

KEITH: Politically, I guess you could say that it is an expression that I don't like to hear, but where could

(KEITH) the conservatives go. They could only go to me. I didn't vote that way very often. It had a relatively small impact on my constituents.

I was one of two Republicans to vote against a veterans bill. I think it helped me. It would have done away with a means test for anybody that went to a VA [Veterans Administration] hospital. You can go to a VA hospital if you have a service-incurred disability or if you cannot afford to go any place else. They were going to remove that "or if you can't afford to go any place else" so that anybody could go to a veterans hospital. It would be terribly expensive and terribly inequitable. You know, as I think about it with reference to the doctors, they never gave me any credit for that kind of thing.

But, speaking of the doctors, I think one of the most satisfying experiences I ever had in the political arena was with what we knew as the [Michael E.] DeBakey Commission Report. DeBakey, as you may know, but your audience probably would not know, runs a tremendously important and successful clinic in Texas, dealing for the most part in heart problems. And I think it was the Kennedy administration that commissioned him as the chairman to see what they could do about heart, stroke, and cancer. These were the three killers. And they came back with, I believe, a billion or maybe two billion dollar program to find out all that they could about heart, stroke, and cancer by setting up giant regional medical facilities under federal auspices--one which specializes in heart and one in stroke and one in cancer--or all of them would have those amongst their facilities' means of fighting cancer. And as this thing went along, the medical societies weren't fighting it because it's pretty hard to talk critically about anything that has as its purpose the curing of heart, stroke and cancer. There was a doctor in my district, Robert Browning, who came from Plymouth. He was the chairman of the legislative committee for the Massachusetts Medical Society. He wrote me about it, and I said, "Well, gee, you know, you make sense. Why don't you come down here and we'll get together and talk about it. I'll arrange for you to meet with the subcommittee." And the thrust of the arguments against it which evolved either from AMA, or from him, or from me, or all three, was if you set up these rival institutions, it would drain off some of the capabilities from the existing institutions instead of having as good a staff at Mass General and elsewhere, you'd have a drift-away from them and to these other institutions with great prestige good pay and the best of facilities. Instead of doing that, why not strengthen the existing institutions?

As a result of his presentation the whole thing was turned around. It was changed in concept - it became instead

(KEITH) a regional medical planning proposal. It is not heart, stroke and cancer, it's regional; but that is the history of it. The turning point really came from Dr. Browning's testimony. (He has since died of a heart attack, I think.) Because of him the whole thrust of the thing was changed. It went from \$2 billion or 1 billion to \$400 million. It finally became regional medical planning.

That brings to mind another little anecdote - even though I had supported Medicare, the doctors who knew me well respected me, and the Plymouth County Medical Society authorized Cliff Agnew who went to the University of Vermont, to come over and give me a contribution. It was \$400 and I said, "Cliff, thanks just the same, but if I were to report this, and I would, and then change my mind and support your position, my opponent would say that I had been bought off, so I appreciate what you've done, but thanks just the same." And he was grateful for my frankness and went back, and I'm sure he relayed it to his doctors. So, I had more support than if I'd accepted it, actually, and the support was worth more to me than was the \$400, and also I didn't want to appear beholden to the doctors. I don't know how often I said this but many a time someone would say, "Hastings Keith is the only one that I ever knew that ever sent back any money that I gave him," [Laughter.] Seabury Stanton, Birkshire Hathaway, Charlie Eaton of Eaton and Howard, and a dozen others. But, I guess you could say that when I gave this money back, it wasn't always just because I didn't need it. I just didn't want to take it; but it oftentimes was good politics too.

MORRISSEY: As a freshman congressman, you were running for reelection in 1960 with John Kennedy at the top of the ticket, bringing out that huge vote (Catholic and otherwise). Any fear that it might be a one-term career?

KEITH: Well, I had Eddie Harrington running against me, and I had the Cape Cod National Seashore bill which hadn't gone through, and I was being blamed by him and by others for its not going through. Any reservations which I expressed were considered by the off Cape press to be not matters of general concern nor matters of principal. I could hardly speak my mind - even about boundaries - without having Eddie Harrington accuse me of dragging my feet. But there was little real fear that he would defeat me because people on the Cape knew how hard I was working to perfect the legislation - and most everybody seemed to sense my true concern. Besides that the unique nature of the bill called for a lot of selling in both Washington and on the Cape. The bill wasn't perfect, but it was the best damn bill that has ever come down the pike as far as seashore legislation was concerned because it provided for enclaves for the first time in the history of park legislation. People

(KEITH) were going to be allowed to live in the park. This not only preserved the tax base, but it made the boundaries a matter of great importance.

But, apropos of the possibility of this being a single term for Keith, Saltonstall didn't know whether he was in a tough fight or not. Charles Colson, his campaign manager, wanted to win no matter what. He wanted to win big and wasn't going to take any chances. That's just the nature of Colson. Saltonstall could very easily have said, "It isn't Hastings Keith's fault that this bill hasn't become law. He's worked hard for it. He really doesn't deserve this criticism. Anybody that's followed this legislation at all carefully knows that Keith is for a good park, but that if he speaks without any reservations, he's lost the opportunity to improve the legislation in his constituent's interest, and it's not an open-and-shut case."

(I might add that Senator Saltonstall in 1957, I think it was, had a front-page story in the New Bedford Standard Times. He came out against the seashore.)

At any rate, Saltonstall's office let me bear the brunt of the blame for it's not getting through, and that did worry me. And the Globe and the Herald both editorialized against me.

MORRISSEY: Of course, Saltonstall did well in the year of the Kennedy presidential race?

KEITH: Yes.

MORRISSEY: In other words, Massachusetts voters purportedly split their tickets.

KEITH: Yes. Saltonstall never opposed Kennedy and Kennedy never opposed Saltonstall.

MORRISSEY: I was going to ask you if you had any observations on that relationship.

KEITH: I think it was almost father and son in some respects--a great deal of respect and affection.

MORRISSEY: In the '52 Kennedy-Lodge senatorial race in Massachusetts, a lot of people have credited Basil Brewer with playing a very decisive role in Kennedy's victory.

KEITH: Well, Basil Brewer was essentially a conservative and considered Taft to be the epitome of that political

(KEITH) philosophy at that time, and therefore, Taft was his candidate. Lodge, he considered to be, and I think properly so, a liberal Republican, hoping to win, even if he had to sacrifice his friends, and that's, you know, what has to be done sometimes. My father used to say that in the legislature when he was serving with Lodge or about that time when he was acquainted with Lodge, Lodge would ask to be "off" (i.e. to divert from the party position), not like Conte just telling us he is "off," but Lodge, at least, had the gentility to ask to be "off" on a great many party measures. This was primarily because he wanted to build a base to run for the United States Senate from the house of representatives in Massachusetts.

This is the kind of thing that Basil Brewer just couldn't understand or forgive. So he, Brewer, ran and was elected, a delegate - I believe, the only one from Massachusetts. He was given a half a vote because it was a split outcome. And I think it was understood that he might very well be made ambassador to Portugal if he did get it. That's not legal it's just supposition, but in my view, the paper did slant its stories to help the Kennedy candidacy against Lodge.

And in my view, Kennedy would not have won but for that support. I can document it further. It's a pretty informed judgment, and I was following it fairly closely. I would say further that, well, Lodge was Lodge, and I guess he never had the excitement of the campaign like Brad Morse or Hastings Keith. He didn't have the zest for it. He had a more studied approach, more (what is the word for it, I can't give it to you, but there is a word). I guess, noblesse oblige. But any rate, I think without a doubt, Brewer is responsible, if anybody, for Kennedy's victory.

END SIDE 2, TAPE III

END SESSION I

Session II--June 2, 1979

Place: Cosmos Club, 2121 Massachusetts Avenue, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

Interviewer: Charles T. Morrissey

BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE IV

MORRISSEY: As odd as it sounds, in our last interview, we didn't get to the roots of your interest in the funding of the social security system.

KEITH: Well actually, I wonder if you mean funding of the social security system or the funding of retirement plans on a national basis.

MORRISSEY: Both.

KEITH: The social security system should be universal. To understand this and put it in the proper perspective, I should explain that initially, the federal employees were poorly paid and denied a chance to share in the bounty of America, consequently they were generously retired, comparatively speaking. When the Civil Service Retirement Act was passed in 1920, they were earning on the average less than \$5,000 a year and they got about \$2,500 a year pension. And then, during the Depression, along came another system for the private sector. Roosevelt realized that in an industrial society, loads of people were denied a chance to share in its bounty by circumstances beyond their control; they could suddenly find themselves entirely destitute: so he provided social security for them. And there's an argument as to whether or not that was to be funded in the conventional fashion or whether or not it was to be an inter-generational transfer. This generation's retirement would be paid by successive generations, and they would just make payments which anticipated revenues later on and were not necessarily going to be adequate to fund the retirement plan for that particular individual.

Social Security

A lot of people overlook the fact that these are not only retirement benefits for the retiree but also benefits for their surviving spouse and dependent children. In addition there are also disability claims that drain the retirement fund. I had two brothers who died--one of them with four children and the other with two: one of them at the age of forty and the other at the age of fifty-five. They never lived to get their retirement benefits, but their widows have been doing quite nicely with the tax-free income from social security and their individual insurance programs.

(KEITH) In recent years, Congress in response to pressures from the participants - has liberalized the benefit program for public employees. It increased the salary, lowered the retirement age, but neglected to change the pension formula. In addition to all of this, Congress added a cost of living provision!

So there are two systems. What happens now is that the average federal retiree quits at the age of fifty-five or fifty-seven with \$900 a month pension. They went to comparability of salary but not to comparability of total compensation.

On the other hand the average retiree in the private sector who gets a pension, gets about \$2,500 to \$3,000 a year, and only half of them get that - and few if any of these pensioners are adjusted for changes in the cost of living. So pensioners in the private sector just have indexation in the social security portions of their pension plans. Further the law is such that people who have poor earnings records get socially weighted benefits under social security. So, the "poor" federal retiree quits with nine hundred bucks a month at the age of fifty-five and goes to work in the private sector and gets an additional pension benefit that's based upon a "poor" earnings record. And he may have only put in 6 to 8 percent of the equity, and yet draw a pension of \$150 to \$200 or \$300, or more a month, tax-free, on top of the other pension. So when he reaches the age of sixty-five, he could get 110 percent of income. (pt out chrt - v)

And as I mentioned earlier, in an inflationary spiral the federal government is the only plan where he gets a pension that is fully indexed to inflation. My pension will go up next month by a couple of hundred dollars a month, just because of the cost of living increase. But the poor fellow who's in the private sector, living on a pension, he's lucky if he gets \$300 a month on the average - and only the social security portion is indexed.

In effect, the federal pension plan is so generous that the federal employee feels that he must get out after thirty years at age fifty-five--or earlier if there is a reduction in force - take his pension and get a job in the private sector. In short he is taking advantage of two oversights in the law: (1) early retirement age - without actually reduced benefits and (2) full indexation of benefits - i.e. benefits that go up with the cost of living. - - And, on the other hand, the worker in private industry has to work that much longer to pay for the benefits of the federal retiree. It portends, I believe, the creation of an elite class of people - those who have both social security and a federal pension. John Q. Citizen, the taxpayer, can't afford such generosity.

MORRISSEY: What keyed your interest in this subject?

KEITH: Well, basically, I guess, I've always been public-service oriented (all of my life. It's been a family tradition.) And when I quit the Congress, I had thought I might enjoy retirement and ruminating and writing on Cape Cod, but my pension went from fifteen hundred and sixty bucks a month at the age of fifty-seven to \$2,200 a month - and all of this in less than three years' time.

when he was still
I used to teach at B.U. [Boston University] in the Evening College of Commerce. The course was for CLU's and prepared students for the Economics and Sociology part of the exam for Chartered Life Underwriters. I just knew a little bit about compound interest but I remembered what [Albert] Einstein said ~~as to~~ "What was man's most important invention?" He didn't say the wheel or the lever, or modestly, my theory of relativity." He said "compound interest."

I asked a banker friend of mine, "Where would pensions go at this rate of inflation?" And he said, "Well, they would go through the roof." And I said, "Well, how much would these pensions cost?" And to make a long story short, at the time I asked the question there were 2.3 million retirees. If we assume that each of them had a \$50 increment caused by that 1 percent "add on" which my pension provided, ~~there~~ *their* pension would cost about as much as the cost of the war in Vietnam. It would, compounded at 3 percent semi-annually amount to \$154 billion. This was the cost, for these benefits for the current retirees (1976) and their surviving spouses. That gives you some idea of the order of magnitude. It was just "mind boggling." I conveyed my concerns to a few friends and I wrote a few letters and I found myself entirely embroiled, and I have been ever since because it's such a fascinating phenomena when you do a few projections, and then you make some predictions.

MORRISSEY: Why do you suppose this issue has not caught the public concern?

KEITH: Because basically people feel that things take care of themselves in our society, and we'll muddle through. (In policy analysis and formulation it is called incrementalism). There are only two ways that this can be straightened away for the rest of our society. Customarily, elected officials straighten out things like this by just giving more people more things to balance out what they've given to a special group; but with an indexation provision in there, the men and women that are already getting more than their share will get more than more than their share. So it's almost impossible to

(KEITH) straighten out, except with radical surgery. And nobody wants to face up to that radical surgery any more than they do the energy problem. It's human nature.

MORRISSEY: Were pensions important to some of your constituents? I'm wondering if the number of elderly people who retired on Cape Cod put this in a particular context for you?

KEITH: Well, the average member of the senior citizens councils only have social security - particularly in the city of New Bedford. They read something that I wrote for the Reader's Digest, and they thought it was very interesting because it pointed out how well the federal retiree was doing. They knew that they weren't doing anywhere near as well. So they asked me to come up there and talk to them. In New Bedford the city is divided into sixty-three senior citizen councils. They met in general conclave. Most of them just get social security with perhaps half a dozen getting federal retirement, as well.

MORRISSEY: Had some of these people retired "early" because of textiles moving out or unemployment in general?

KEITH: Most of the people in the city of New Bedford don't really retire, they go on semi-retirement and earn a little bit to supplement their social security. "Sixty Minutes" followed me up there, by the way.

MORRISSEY: Oh, really?

KEITH: And their scheduling was two months away. In the interim period, the legislation for which I was pushing (removal of the "1 percent add-on"), became law, and so they didn't run it. But I might add, too, that I didn't try to make a political rally out of this, and it wasn't as exciting a "Sixty Minutes" as perhaps some of the other things which they had under current consideration.

I have the feeling that what we're doing here now is based upon your rather extensive knowledge of my particular interests and won't be as meaningful for the person who is picking it up later on and using it. How does this all fit into your library?

MORRISSEY: I'm basically trying to ascertain why particular legislators take an interest in particular subjects and how that relates to the fact that they have to get elected from a particular constituency.

KEITH: I see.

MORRISSEY: And yours is almost unique in that respect.

KEITH: Well, mine was extraordinarily unique. Cape Cod had hoped it would be a retirement community, and that's why the people down there resented the Cape Cod National Seashore. They thought they could take care of that problem themselves. They didn't realize that the move to the beaches was beyond their control. They felt that if they continued to buy up the shoreline and have their commercial activities carefully zoned by the town government, that they could control it; but they were wrong. And even if they had controlled it, it would not have been shared with the rest of the nation. So, some thoughtful people there joined with me in that. But, at any rate, there was a retirement community there, and there are a lot of old people in Massachusetts anyway. New Bedford for example, has a very aged population. They came there with the textile industry, and they're starving, relatively speaking, as they try to pay the high taxes on their old houses.

The same thing is true of the city of Brockton. It was a shoe city and the surrounding towns were suburbs of it. Brockton has now become a suburb of Boston, they just don't have much industry. On along the shoreline there are many retired people - that is from Situate and Cohasset down to the Cape. So my concern has grown as I have thought about the future of these people as contrasted with the lucky federal retiree with his early retirement and his social security.

MORRISSEY: But the interest, as I see it, really came from your personal experience in life insurance and teaching at Boston University.

KEITH: Yes.

MORRISSEY: More so than from the nature of your constituency.

KEITH: I would say so. I'm sort of a self-styled salesman and actuary, I guess, combined. I was never a superb salesman, because I always was interested in having the insured know all the details, and oftentimes, I, perhaps, talked beyond the point where the sale was made to make sure that the fellow understood what he had. Sometimes he would get too much learning and get lost in the details. He might even change his mind and not buy! [Laughter.] Nevertheless, he knew what he was getting.

(KEITH) My interest was intensified while I was in the state senate when state pensions were in a mess (and they still are) and, of course, while I was in the Congress - but most particularly now that I am a beneficiary.

I am proud to say that my wife, Bland Keith, shares my concern about the equity and the costs of early retirements and has been very helpful to me in my efforts to achieve reform. (My second marriage was to Francis Bland Jackson, who had been an employee of the C.I.A. Shortly after we were married, she completed twenty-five years with that agency and was in a position to take early retirement.)

MORRISSEY: I reread last night Francis P. Burling's booklet The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore (Plymouth, Mass., The Leyden Press, 1978, 67 pp), and this is your annotated copy (Morrissey hands booklet to Rep. Keith). You have a quotation on page 41 with a reference to a paragraph on page 40, and I can't decipher your handwriting.

KEITH: "Main reservation was that emphasis be on conservation, not recreation."* I can read that even though the writing isn't very good.

*Rep. Keith's handwritten note referred to this paragraph on page 40 of Francis P. Burling's booklet:

"The Quincy Patriot Ledger in an editorial 'Why Cape Park Bill Collapsed' stated that the legislation collapsed because of several key factors--'The Administration, represented by Interior and the National Park Service, dawdled too long before reporting a final park bill to Congress, the Senate Interior Committee wasted precious time in scheduling hearings on the bill after it received the report, substantial changes were offered at the last minute by Cape town officials, and Rep. Hastings Keith, whose district would be most affected. . .withheld final all-out support of the bill because of strong reservations on the part of many of his constituents.'"

MORRISSEY: That is your writing?

KEITH: Yes, it is mine. I knew what it was going to say, and I can understand why you wouldn't. But my main reservation about the seashore was that the emphasis wouldn't be on conservation, but on recreation. You could have bus-loads of people coming from New York and Boston descending on the Cape. They have an expression down there, "They arrive in their dirty clothes with a five dollar bill, and they leave on Monday morning. They don't change either--the clothes or the five dollar bill."

(KEITH) Senator Saltonstall had a staff assistant Harold Putnam (with whom I had served in the state legislature) who wrote in the senator's newsletter about the Cape Cod National Seashore, "Now, at last the people of Fall River and New Bedford will have a place where they can swim." He didn't know what he was talking about. While he and I were in the state legislature together, that is, his staff assistant and I, we voted for Horseneck Beach, which Chris Herter wanted for the people of Fall River and New Bedford. The people from Fall River and New Bedford didn't need a place to swim; they had one.

But, that social concept on the part of his staff assistant, whose name was Harold Putnam, was to always look out for the poor people, and even though the poor people in this case were well taken care of, he still thought that was where the votes were. And, it was this concept that concerned me. A lot of people really felt it should be turned into a beach. Actually, the outer beach is not a very good place to swim. There's a tremendous undertow in some areas. It's more for the magnificence of its beauty; it's more for the Thoreau-type of enjoyment, rather than the girl in the bikini.

MORRISSEY: So, how were these two reconciled in the formation of the seashore?

KEITH: Reconciled is not quite the right word. The beauty of the beach and upland dominated the philosophy. It was too cold for the girl in the bikini, anyway. The bill does provide for an advisory board and it has some authority. One of my biggest arguments was over its creation and powers. They even set a termination date for it. It was to be terminated after the seashore policies had been established. The people in the Park Service didn't seem to want to have an interface with the public. They seemed a bit elitist at the time. Now, that may have changed subsequently because of the involvement of people and the kinds of people who come into the federal government, but there is that danger. And, that was one of the fights we had, so they've resolved it.

There's no camping in the seashore, the use of motor vehicles on the seashore itself is very restricted. In fact, I think in most cases it's prohibited. The very design of the headquarters buildings and of the facilities themselves are not such that they would appeal to people who are pleasure seeking. It's for people who are seeking solace from the world's turbulence and thoughtful people who enjoy nature's bounty. It's almost a dignified kind of thing. As for the building--I would say people approach it in a more leisurely

(KEITH) fashion. They're not hurrying up, a ferris wheel to get a ticket. They're walking along and looking at the ocean in the distance or the fields around.

It is my recollection that the first bill for the seashore that was filed was to take five hundred yards along the beach for a period of several miles, so that that would be preserved. And that's what frightened me. Behind that, you'd have had your parks, recreation--the kids could be amused, and the older folks could sun themselves on the beach--that was one of the original concepts of some of the people who wanted it. It would have just Jerseyized it. Our proposal on the other hand took the whole swath across the Cape.

MORRISSEY: Interesting verb, "Jerseyized."

KEITH: Yes. Well, it isn't original. The opponents of the park came up with all of these things, and the proponents had their choice language as well. The opponents said that it was a Madison Avenue approach, that Rockefeller was behind it all.

MORRISSEY: Which one?

KEITH: I don't know, just the Rockefellers, I guess. But there's a foundation, mostly with Rockefeller money, that paid for the first studies along the eastern seaboard.

MORRISSEY: It's mentioned in Burling's book, but he doesn't identify the foundation.

KEITH: It's Old Dominion. It just came to me. Now that's out of fifteen years in the past.

KEITH: Well, the Mellons have a summer home; in fact, the family is reported to sort of control Oyster Harbor. And I still have great reverence and respect for people who preserve for posterity things of this sort, whether they be the Carnegies or the Mellons or Rockefellers or anybody else.

MORRISSEY: As I try to visualize your situation at the time the seashore was being discussed as a possibility, you seemed to be concerned with the defining of the boundaries, so that a lot of local communities and residents thereof would have their rights duly protected.

KEITH: Well, I was, for two reasons. The towns have a tax problem--you know, the city of Boston has so darn much property that is owned by the church and by the government and by the educational institutions, that there is darn little

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(KEITH) revenue coming in. And, yet, they have to provide police and fire protection for these charitable or educational institutions. So, it was necessary that they have a chance to develop some of that lovely shoreline for those people who could afford it, and, through their tax contributions, contribute to the services that the whole town needed. They need more than park attendants and policemen and firemen, they need to have others as well. But, of course, it was successfully argued by those people who did own land within the park (and this was a unique provision, as I think we probably mentioned before that what was being preserved was a way of life.) It was the first time that the Park Service ever bought the idea of enclaves within the park.

MORRISSEY: Was it hard to convince the Park Service on that point?

KEITH: It was a very difficult process. There were those within the Park Service who realized that we were trying to save a way of life. Out at Monomoy, which they wanted to have in the park, there were, perhaps, ten people whose families had shacks where they went down and ruminated and wrote and fished. They were all bulldozed. They wanted to turn this island into the park, and it was one of the things that I wanted out. Not because I didn't want it preserved; I did. We got it into a wilderness area, but I didn't want people going through the town of Chatham to get to Monomoy and overrunning the streets of Chatham. I was as much concerned about Chatham as I was Monomoy.

MORRISSEY: There was another island. I think it's Morris Island that you wanted out of the park.

KEITH: Yes. Morris Island is enroute to Monomoy, and Morris Island had a design development; I think it was by Durrell, Edward Durrell of Durrell and Stone. It had been awarded a prize for one of the most outstanding combinations of natural resources and human abodes.

There's a rather interesting little political story - even a lesson - that goes along with it. The Saltonstall staff and, to some extent, my staff, wanted Morris Island in the seashore. They were afraid it was going to be destroyed by the town. The people who had developed it had set aside certain portions for, what you might call, vest-pocket parks, within the Island itself.

Now, in the arguments advanced by the Park Service for having it in, they mentioned that the federal government had paid \$260 thousand for the causeway; therefore, the town didn't have as much right to it as if the town had built the causeway. Well, my homework was such that I knew who had

(KEITH) paid for it. The town had put up \$160 thousand, or whatever the figure was. They had more than matched the federal grant, and they had done it because they were going to get a return on the investment in the lovely homes that would be built there. And because the Park Service misrepresented this fact, I capitalized on it, and my colleagues felt that they hadn't done their homework, and that I had, and accordingly the witness was somewhat discredited. I was almost sorry for him because it was an honest error; but, nevertheless, I had to do it. But I can't let the impression stand that the Park Service was callous about this whole thing. I have a lot of respect for Connie [Conrad] Worth and the others who were active in it. And the bill that was eventually passed was an excellent piece of legislation.

Incidentally, of course, many of these people who were in the Park Service were taking advantage of early retirement and going to work for other government agencies in other states, and getting a nice little pension plan elsewhere. It's a shame that our whole personnel system is set up to get rid of people when they reach their prime.

MORRISSEY: How about the Great Pond-Long Pond area, did you want to exclude that also from the boundaries of the park?

KEITH: I don't recall that at all. Great Pond to me doesn't signify much of anything. If I could see the map I might recall it, but Great Pond is the name that's given to a pond that's more than ten acres in size, and I don't see a particular--

MORRISSEY: Apparently, it was part of Chatham, and there was some feeling that it should be excluded from the park.

KEITH: Well, there were people who misunderstood the legislation (or chose to misunderstand it) and thought that they were going to lose their homes because all the times previously the Park Service had taken this property by what they--they even have an awful name for the procedure: it isn't eminent domain, a term we use in Massachusetts; it isn't what they call condemnation--that's the way the federal government legally phrases the procedure. It's a very unfortunate term. And these people thought they were going to have all their property condemned. I had more correspondence with people trying to convince them that their property wasn't going to be condemned as you do with an area which has been deteriorating.

MORRISSEY: You made a penciled note next to the comment on page 49. I was wondering why (at the bottom there on page 49).

KEITH: "An interesting feature of Keith's bill, which was not in the Saltonstall-Smith bill and about which nothing was said at either hearing, was a provision directing the Secretary of the Interior to take immediate action as necessary to preserve adequate water passage to the Atlantic Ocean from both Pleasant Bay and Nauset Harbor in Orleans. This provision was omitted without explanation as the legislation was finally enacted." Well, it is an interesting feature that was omitted when it was finally enacted. I suppose it was argued by the engineers that in no way would the seashore affect their present responsibility; and why should you foreclose from them if it should develop that there was no longer any reason for access of that sort. There would be no judgmental factor involved. They would just have to keep it going. Capt Cod is, by nature, suspicious of the federal government, and the people in the town of Chatham historically have gone across the bars at Chatham over the centuries,

END SIDE 1, TAPE IV

BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE IV

the barrier beach sometimes marries up with Monomoy and closes up off Chatham itself. I mean over a period of a hundred years. And, just where that access would be is the kind of thing you could argue both ways. So, they said, "Take it out because we'll take care of it anyway." And I hope the record is fairly clear on it.

MORRISSEY: I notice from the record you were not, formally, a member of the conference committee on that bill, but were you involved in the effort of the conference committee to hammer out a--

KEITH: The conference committee is not there to protect an individual congressman's constituent interests; it is there to resolve differences between the two branches. It is supposed to do so in time. I wasn't on the House or the Senate committee that dealt with the seashore legislation. The conference committee would consist of senior members of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. It would be very bad practice for anybody who is an interested party to be on a conference committee, I would certainly have had quite a bit of leverage. There's altogether too much influencing of legislation as it is.

MORRISSEY: It's just interesting from a historian's viewpoint because the process of reconciliation is often totally undocumented, and you wonder how they agree to do one thing on the one hand and something else on the other.

KEITH: I wish I had more faith in the committee system. I had more faith in it when I was a member of Congress than I do now that I'm out of the Congress and getting involved in this pension thing. I went to a hearing the other day on pensions (civil service) which was to determine how the funding of pensions was to be arranged--and whether or not there should be integration with social security. There was one person at the hearing from the members of Congress, and yet, this should be the hottest issue coming up in the next two years.

MORRISSEY: Could you tell me again what you told me in the car coming up here today about not disclosing your position on the seashore, lest you lose your leverage and your power to affect the outcome.

KEITH: Well, perhaps I made it clear too soon that I was for the seashore. From a practical point of view, I have found in other negotiable issues, if one makes a commitment early on as to where one stands, one loses one's bargaining power. I did well to come out for the seashore in view of the sentiments in my district, and yet there was no doubt in my mind from the start that the seashore had to come. I took a positive approach to it and tried to shape it in a way that would be in the best interests of the Cape and of the nation. These points of view were not incompatible - and I was able to convey to my constituents - at least to a substantial majority of them - the genuineness of this belief. Even the town of Wellfleet, where almost all of the leadership (particularly the local leadership, i.e. the voter was against the park) gave me good support because of my willingness to listen to their views. There were, of course, some really thoughtful people with vision who did support the park. Amongst them were Cyril Downs - particularly Mrs. Downs - and John Dyer, an attorney. I made numerous visits to the Cape to explain the bill - and before filing the bill I flew up to the Cape and went over the proposal with a fine-tooth comb with two lawyers in whom I had great confidence. They were Kenneth Wilson, the counsel of Barnstable County and Henry Smith who was, I considered, one of the foremost authorities on eminent domain on the Cape. It is interesting that even though I was closeted with them for at least six hours, the only major criticism was with the cut-off date for the bringing of actions against the individuals who had started to build in the area in which the proposed park would be located. Several people had hoped to stake out claims within the proposed taking. These attorneys felt that the cutoff date should be advanced. Their recommendations were incorporated into the bill that was filed by Saltonstall, Kennedy and Keith.

MORRISSEY: In the Burling narrative, you're depicted as the guy on the hot seat.

KEITH: Well, there was no doubt about it, and that was my role and responsibility.

MORRISSEY: And this came up right after you first entered the Congress.

KEITH: It came up before I entered the Congress. I went down to talk to Frank Burling in 1956 about the seashore, and he knew of my support for it then in concept. And so did the editor of his paper, who used to be with the Congressional Quarterly down here.

MORRISSEY: Let me go on to some issues that popped up in your district while you were representing it in Congress. You had a strike at the Ford River shipyard?

KEITH: Yes.

MORRISSEY: Did you get involved in trying to settle that?

KEITH: No. I didn't, and it was really the largest employer in my district. It's not Ford River, it's Fore River.

MORRISSEY: I'm sorry, I know that. I said it incorrectly, F-o-r-e?

KEITH: Yes.

MORRISSEY: That may be my [laughter] single lapse into a Boston accent, which I thought I left behind. [Laughter.]

The Hingham Naval Depot was shut down while you were in. Did you try to keep it open?

KEITH: That was a very poor example of the way the federal government responds. I was elected in November of '58, and on about December 5th of '59 (excuse me, of '58), they announced that the naval ammunition depot would be closed.

MORRISSEY: That's the Hingham depot?

KEITH: No.

MORRISSEY: Or the one in Hingham?

KEITH: It's the one in Hingham.

MORRISSEY: Because I have a note here also that they closed the Illingham Ammunition Depot.

KEITH: That was somewhere else. But the concept at that time was that we were going to go for massive retaliation. We no longer would need conventional warfare weaponry. You know, mankind hasn't changed, warfare hasn't changed to the extent that we can do without conventional weapons, both on the land and on the sea.

But, the point I'm getting at is that two weeks before Christmas, they announced this, and there were eight hundred people who were employed there, if I recall correctly. I just thought it was very callous of them, and that I should have been alerted beforehand. I would have advised them, at least, not to do it just before Christmas.

MORRISSEY: What can a congressman do to try to keep an installation open like that?

KEITH: Well, there's a lot they can do, and it depends upon what kind of hardball they want to play. Obviously, Mendel Rivers--if the ammunition depot had been in his yard, it wouldn't have closed. He was chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I was a freshman congressman and just elected, and at least they didn't do it just before the election. [Laughter.]

So, depending upon, you know, your integrity and your understanding of the problem, and your maturity, you respond differently. I, in retrospect, as something of a student of warfare, should have argued that they were wrong. I could have said so anyway. And that they were wrong in not having that facility maintained. Because as you know, the need for conventional weaponry has continued.

MORRISSEY: Did they try to close Otis Air Base?

KEITH: Oh, yes, and the Weymouth Naval Air Station. Every congressman spends a lot of time fighting for those kinds of facilities in his district. Sometimes, the congressman thinks twice about it and says to his constituents "do you really want that federal facility there and to have the economy built up around it; the labor force being paid much better than the local people are being paid, and therefore, raising the cost of doing business in that community?" It brings a lot of money in, but it has several impacts that makes you have some reservations. But you respond as your constituency wants you to, generally speaking, because there's nobody else to whom they can turn.

MORRISSEY: What's the story on the Rodman Job Center?

KEITH: Oh, that was a fascinating experiment in an attempt to make up for some of the wrongs that had been done in our society. I would put "wrongs" in quotes. These were places where kids who hadn't learned a trade could go and learn it at government expense. They could be taken off the streets of New York or Boston--any place-- and put into the Rodman Job Center and learn a profession or a trade and go back into society.

Oftentimes, these kids came from ghetto areas where a different lifestyle prevailed, and the people who lived in the immediate vicinity didn't like the idea of having people with different ethics brought into their community and perhaps courting or seducing their daughters - that kind of thing. So, it became a hot political issue. The whole nation seemed to have, at that time, a guilt complex, and felt that it owed these people a chance at a job, and that that was the best way to do it. I guess at the time I felt that we did too, and for the time it was probably an appropriate response.

MORRISSEY: Did you get involved at all in efforts such as to make fish flour?

KEITH: Oh, you're asking a leading question - it was very much in my bailiwick! There was a head of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Don McKiernan, who later became our ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conferences. (He's probably now retired and working for some allied interest on a salary plus his pension) Awfully nice, capable, guy, who said, some 18 to 20 years ago, "You know, the ocean is just filled with fish that are considered trash fish" that could be ground up into fish flour, and we could feed the world; save the people of South America from starvation, from what they called Kwashiarkor. That's the disease that comes when a second child arrives and the first one can no longer nurse at the mother's breast, so it doesn't get the right kind of protein. But if you had fish protein concentrate, as we later called it, instead of fish flour, and could add it to another kind of food--bread, for example--the child would get sufficient protein in his diet to enable him to grow up strong and straight.

So, I became an ardent proponent of this and went down to Latin America and talked with people; went to Peru, went to Mexico, observed what they were doing. It was a big issue with the New Bedford Standard Times. It had possibilities as a way to save the city and as a way to save the undernourished people of the world.

(KEITH) It was a big issue with the fisherman, but the real problem came because of the attitude of the Food and Drug Administration. There was a Delaney amendment which said that (and it was very difficult to vote against) any food that contains any filth could not be sold. If you ground up the whole fish, you had a certain amount of feces. It completely overlooked the oyster and the clam. There wasn't any really good argument, but in particular, they were concerned about the fluoride content in the fish protein concentrate.

This got to be a terribly big issue with Food and Drug. They came out strongly against fish protein concentrate on the grounds that the fluoride would cause mottling of teeth. Well, this was an old chestnut to me. I had been chairman of a commission that had studied the fluoridation of public water supplies when I was in the [Massachusetts] state senate. And there was - and potentially is - no hotter subject than fluoridation.

The city government of Montreal was turned out of office on this issue. I could go on for hours about fluoridation. I had gone out to Kingston and Newburgh, New York, and looked in the mouths of the kids in these towns - these were two test communities, side-by-side, I had seen six hundred kids with hardly a sign of caries (or cavities) in one town. On the other hand, in the other town, most of the kids had the same kind of teeth that I did when I was growing up. So, I felt that fluoridation of water supplies was all right.

It was pushed by the health authorities in the same Food and Drug Agency that was then protesting that mottling would result from fish protein concentrate. Well, that meant that teeth would be strengthened and so would other bones, so I said to this witness, "Well, if you've found mottling in just one person in a thousand, would you consider it such that you wouldn't favor fish protein concentrate?" He said, "Oh yes, regardless of the percentage." I said, "Well, that's exactly contrary to what your department was saying ten years ago with reference to the fluoridation of public water supplies." But, it made no difference to them. They insisted that it be packaged in one-pound packages so that one couldn't get too much - so that people would know what they were buying. That was about the most ridiculous exercise in bureaucracy that I've ever known. The interest in it has died down. There's plenty of market for fish now, and the two hundred mile limit has changed the whole fishery ballgame.

Incidentally, I was the leader in the effort to get a fishery zone. We used to have a three-mile limit; and, in the early part of my career, I filed legislation providing for a fishery zone, extending the three-mile zone out to } }

(KEITH) twelve miles (a nine-mile addition) on the grounds that we would control the propagation and fishing and conservation much better. That was of almost as much significance as the two hundred mile limit. But as to the two hundred mile limit, which I also sponsored, McKiernan said, "You mustn't get involved in that, Mr. Keith. It's a very complicated affair and we need to have our options open in order to bargain in the Law of the Sea Conferences, in which we're now entering; and so we don't want to have our waters muddied by that kind of thing." I, nevertheless, persisted in my interest and incurred neither the pleasure of my fisherman because I was too moderate, nor that of the Department of State.

MORRISSEY: Sounds like another hot seat.

KEITH: It's another hot seat. Very much so. It's rather interesting that my successor was able to trap McKiernan and win an argument with him concerning the two hundred mile limit. McKiernan mentioned that the United States recognized Brazil's two hundred mile limit for lobsters; and my successor immediately pointed out, "Well, if it's good enough for Brazil, why isn't it good enough for the people of New Bedford?" McKiernan, I understand, didn't have a good answer for that one, and that helped to support the argument for the extension of the two hundred mile limit.

MORRISSEY: Were you involved in efforts to convert sea water into fresh water?

KEITH: I often wonder why there hasn't been more done on that because to listen to the proponents of that, particularly those involved commercially, these plants were just going to, you know, turn deserts into flower gardens. It apparently is a much more expensive process than they thought it was going to be, I don't read about it at all now, and whether nature's taking care of it by giving us more bounteous rainfall, I don't know, but--

MORRISSEY: Occasionally. *[Chuckle.]*

KEITH: Yes. I know last year five thousand wells in Maine went dry because of lack of rainfall. Then when winter came they had plenty of rain, but the ground was frozen. *[Laughter.]* Fortunately, this spring the Lord is taking care of everything.

MORRISSEY: */Pause/* The dumping of atomic waste in the oceans.

KEITH: Well, you've done some research! Where did you discover that?

MORRISSEY: A reference in your scrapbooks. Likewise, the reference to the fish flour.

KEITH: Yes. What reference did you find to atomic waste in the scrapbook?

MORRISSEY: I can't recall, specifically. It was such a while ago that we looked at that. But you do recall how hot an issue that was for a while there?

KEITH: Yes. And, I was very much concerned and asked Woods Hole for its advice, and it reassured me. Knowing what I do today, and having really a mistrust of the elitist kind of mind that determines the policy and implements it at the highest levels, I don't know that I was right in buying their answer. But they convinced me that the tongue of the ocean was about as good a place to put these canisters as any place that there was. And, if they were wrong, we're in for some trouble, I guess.

MORRISSEY: The scrapbooks also show that you gave some thought to quitting after your first term in Congress?

KEITH: No. I don't recall that. That might have been wishful thinking on the part of some columnist. [Laughter.]

MORRISSEY: The Continental Shelf Act of 1965 - were you involved in the formulation of that?

KEITH: Yes, but my memory is rather vague on that one. It apparently wasn't controversial enough to have a long carry-over.

MORRISSEY: How about the concept of marine sanctuaries?

KEITH: That is my baby entirely, and it is a matter of statute and I believe of legislative history. I read recently in an oceanographic magazine that the act is now being used rather extensively. For the first few years there was no interest in it, but of recent date, I think there've been several dozens of applications. What we did was apply the wilderness concept to the ocean. We were having a most difficult time with the people who wanted to drill off Georges Bank. And I felt that not only were there natural resources in the way of fisheries there, but there were other places where oil spills could take place. We didn't need to desecrate or possibly damage irrevocably some natural resources that were really impinging upon the shoreline or the commercial or conservation interests of my constituency - or any other constituency for that matter.

I've got to think about that airport, haven't I?

Keith - 67

MORRISSEY: I'm down to about five minutes.

KEITH: Yes. Could we do it on the way? What time is it now?

MORRISSEY: I have 9:35. What time does your plane leave?

KEITH: Ten o'clock.

END SIDE 2, TAPE IV

ADDENDUM

KEITH: As we drove along to the airport, Mr. Morrissey and I discussed my extraordinary interest in the issue of public employee pensions. I was, even then, so involved in this question that I was hurrying to Massachusetts to discuss funding for a project that I had proposed to former constituents that would shed light on this very important problem.

I think it is most proper that I remind those who have read this political history, that my interest in pensions has kept me involved at an even greater pitch than the other issues such as cranberries and Cape Cod seashores.

I hope to be remembered for the efforts--some of them successful--that I have made to restore equity and common sense to public employees' compensation. Absent some success in this field, the indexation of public employee pensions will establish, in the long run, an elite class in our society. It may bring the nation to the brink of bankruptcy before the climate is right for reform.

